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When Do Chinese Subnational Governments Make Law? 
 




How often does law get made in China, and what kinds of law? We construct a dataset on subnational 
lawmaking to address these questions. The dataset builds on a basic insight: Chinese politicians choose 
among three types of instruments to implement policy—statutes, regulations, and informal policy 
directives (IPDs). IPDs are easier to promulgate than statutes and regulations, and the fact that they lack 
the force of law rarely impedes enforcement. Why then do politicians make law at all?   
 
Several findings shed light on this puzzle. First, the choice between formal lawmaking and IPDs depends 
on the policy subject. Second, provinces and cities have distinct policy specializations. Specialization may 
lead one level of government to invest in lawmaking in the subject, or lead the other level of 
government to refrain from doing so. Third, politician tenure has little impact on lawmaking. Fourth, 
while population is a relevant predictor of lawmaking, other factors that might seem to represent the 
“demand for law” bear unexpected correlations with the quantity of law.   
 
Keywords: Chinese law, legislation, legislative processes, legislative institutions, rulemaking, supply of 
law.   
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When Do Chinese Subnational Governments Make Law? 
 




How often does law get made in China, and what kinds of law? What motivates Chinese 
politicians to pursue lawmaking activities? These are neglected questions in legal and social scientific 
research on China. This may be because their significance for social science has not always been 
apparent. Recent legal theoretical scholarship makes a persuasive case that law is a fundamental (and 
fundamentally distinct) form of social ordering that vastly enhances humankind’s capacity to expand the 
sphere of complex coordination (Shapiro 2013; Hadfield 2016). Despite this, in general little empirical 
research exists yet to explore the relationship between the supply and quantity of law, on the one hand, 
and the quality of social and political institutions, on the other. While law and economics scholars have 
offered insightful theories about the optimal quantity (along with other metrics such as detail and 
accuracy) of law from the perspective of social welfare (e.g. Kaplow 1992; Kaplow 2012; Shavell 2004), 
such theories have generated limited empirical research, especially regarding the non-judicial branches 
of government as sources of law.1 Often, it is simply taken for granted that legislatures and executive 
branch offices make law. Whether they make enough law—and what induce politicians and bureaucrats 
to make more or less law—are still questions touched on only in disparate strands of research.  
 
Political scientists, of course, have always studied policy formation in general and legislative 
institutions in particular (see recent reviews in McNollgast 2007 and de Figuerido and Stiglitz 2017). In 
several recent publications, political scientists studying China have begun to engage with questions 
about the incentives for and determinants of legislation. Truex (forthcoming) focuses on legislative 
delays in China’s National People’s Congress (NPC), arguing that analogues of U.S.-style legislative 
“gridlock” can be found in China’s authoritarian regime. Lü et al. (2018) analyze NPC-member-sponsored 
legislative proposals in the area of education, and offer evidence of coalition formation behind particular 
legislations. Both works represent a renewed focus on People’s Congresses (PCs) in China as institutions 
of legislation and policymaking, as opposed to mere sites of representation.2 Their attention to the 
output of China’s legislative institutions, or what these institutions do, as opposed to who occupy these 
institutions and their attitudes and beliefs, promises to bridge the interests of political scientists and 
those of scholars in legal and other disciplines who view legislatures as providers of law.    
 
Notably, however, existing research on lawmaking in China has generally taken a case study 
approach. Scholars either consider the political processes behind the enactment of particular statutes 
(Tanner 1999; Lü et al. 2018), or, even when they examine the entire legislative agenda for a given 
period (e.g. Truex, forthcoming), take into account only one individual institution (e.g. the NPC). 
                                                 
1 McNollgast (2007) observes that in “legal scholarship, most studies of the law focus on the courts, judges, cases 
and judicial doctrine. While the judiciary is an important source of law, judicial doctrines and decisions do not 
constitute all of law. Most law is set forth in legislation, executive decrees and bureaucratic decisions, yet these 
sources of law have not been as extensively studied as judicial law.” 
2 Truex (forthcoming) observes that “[core] theories of authoritarian politics focus largely on democratization and 
often assume away the policy-making process itself.” Notably, many of Chinese subnational congressional bodies 
that previous researchers examined (e.g. Manion 2015) may not even possess legislative power at all—a point that 
perhaps was not always recognized—and therefore lack direct relevance for the system of Chinese law.  
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Empirical work thus is supported at most by time series data. This limitation also characterizes existing 
studies of subnational legislative bodies in China (Cho 2009; Almén 2013; Manion 2015); researchers 
have been content to focus on particular provincial, city, or county PCs, rendering the case study 
method almost inevitable.  
 
In contrast to the existing literature, this paper offers an empirical overview of the entire 
universe of subnational lawmaking in China during the 2000 to 2015 period. We examine the legislative 
and regulatory outputs of China’s 31 provinces and 49 cities that possessed lawmaking authority during 
this time.3 We also develop detailed topic classifications for such outputs. This allows us simultaneously 
to observe substantial within-country variations in the demand for and the capacity to make law and in 
policy priorities, and to rely on similarities in institutional structures across the country and control for 
common (nation-wide) shocks. Working on this broad canvas, we design analyses to address questions 
that are of interest both to legal scholars (e.g. how much and what kinds of law get made) and to 
political scientists (e.g. what the political incentives are for making law). 
 
We assembled our data from publicly available sources. What render our data construction 
innovative are two underlying approaches. First, we analyze the Chinese system for lawmaking as (or 
analogously to) a parliamentary system. Much of the recent political science literature on China relies 
heavily on the democracy versus autocracy dichotomy, and ignores institutional differences among 
modern democracies.4 However, an extensive body of political science literature (Huber and Shipan 
2002; Moe and Caldwell 1994; Jensen and McGrath 2011) has shown that differences between 
parliamentary and presidential democracies are crucial to understanding differences in legislative 
patterns. In particular, in a parliamentary system, the executive and parliamentary branches often have 
unified political leadership. Consequently, parliamentary constraint on the executive branch and 
parliamentary deliberation do not feature prominently in legislative processes. Drawing on this insight, 
we gathered data not only on statutes but also on formal regulations and informal policy directives 
adopted by core executive offices, and treat these as alternative policy instruments, available to the 
same politicians who promulgate statutes.  
 
Second, we adopt measurements well-grounded in Chinese administrative law, the details of 
which have long eluded casual observers of China’s bureaucracy. Most importantly, we clearly 
distinguish between formal regulations and informal policy directives (IPDs). This allows us both to 
capture with precision an important form of formal lawmaking in China (the making of regulations), and 
to focus on a question previously rarely considered: why do Chinese politicians make law at all, when 
policies for the most part can be implemented through IPDs?    
 
We report four sets of findings. First, provinces and cities differ in their policy foci. There is little 
explicit delineation of the respective policy spheres among different layers of subnational governments 
in China. Therefore it has generally been difficult to ascertain the divisions of labour between provincial 
and city governments in policymaking. We find novel answers to this question by looking at an obvious 
but previously neglected place: lawmaking outcomes. 
 
                                                 
3 Prior to 2015, most prefectural-level cities in China had no lawmaking power at all. See Cui and Wan (2019) for an 
account of the expansion of city-level legislative power due to a 2015 legislative change.  
4 For scholarship coming out of (or influenced by) the U.S., often the U.S. political system is unreflectively adopted 
as the reference framework to stand in for all “democracy”. 
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Second, the likelihood of Chinese politicians choosing formal policy instruments (i.e. statutes 
and regulations) over informal ones (i.e. IPDs) for policy implementation depends on policy type. Certain 
subjects are significantly more likely to be implemented through formal policy instruments, while it is 
the other way around for other subjects. Such correlations between policy content and instrument types 
are observed at both provincial and city levels. One explanation for this pattern is that policy matters for 
which wide social compliance and private enforcement may be important are more likely to be pursued 
through formal lawmaking, because public knowledge is a precondition for private enforcement 
(Hadfield and Weingast 2014). In contrast, policy matters in which public enforcement or 
implementation is dominant may lend themselves more easily to bureaucratic directives (Hadfield and 
Weingast 2016).  
 
Thirdly, political tenure appears to have little impact on the pursuit of lawmaking by political 
leaders in Chinese provinces and cities. This stands in contrast to prior findings that career cycles of 
Chinese local politicians drive infrastructure spending, tax collection, and other performance metrics. In 
other words, some of the strongest predictors of Chinese politicians’ activities that scholars have 
previously identified do not have application in lawmaking. This is consistent with a general pattern 
pervading our data, namely that the Chinese government seems to make very little law. The disuse of 
law, rather than its abuse, is the more important feature of the Chinese political system.    
 
Finally, using the number of statutes, regulations, and IPDs as measures of quantities of law, we 
explore correlations between such quantities and demographic variables such as population and GDP. In 
previous scholarship, such correlations have been interpreted in terms of exogenous demands for law; 
in one formulation (Mulligan and Shleifer 2005), the extent of the market may determine the supply of 
law. We argue that such interpretations should be particularly plausible when applied to the context of 
subnational lawmaking in China, but find puzzling correlations between “the demand for law” and the 
supply of law that raise more questions than they answer. 
 
Overall, we aim to show the importance and rewards of tackling the types of questions outlined 
at the beginning of this paper, and of the methodology we adopt. In particular, we emphasize that to 
understand both political incentives in lawmaking and legislative outcomes in China, a wider range of 
policy instruments needs to be considered than is customary. Our study also carries rich policy 
implications. For instance, the fact that certain policy subjects are best implemented through formal 
lawmaking processes underscores the irrationality of depriving subnational governments of formal 
lawmaking power, i.e. of China’s high degree of legislative centralization. As another example, Chinese 
politicians’ apparent indifference to lawmaking casts an interesting light on President Xi Jinping’s recent 
effort to mobilize the legal system for political purposes (Zhang and Ginsburg, forthcoming).   
 
As our inquiry is already quite broad-ranging, we restrict its scope in several important respects. 
We do not examine lawmaking at the national level. While this has been a focus of much prior 
scholarship, we believe lawmaking at the NPC may need to be considered alongside the adoption of 
formal regulations and IPDs in the executive branch, and in any case national-level lawmaking also 
includes actions of the State Council and its various ministries. We therefore leave the study of national-
level lawmaking to separate work. Another limitation is that while we deploy rich panel data, our 
analysis is entirely descriptive and does not explore causal hypotheses about the determinants of 
legislative outcomes. Finally, we do not engage with many of the theses in existing political science and 
legal scholarship on China (e.g. “fragmented authoritarianism”). Instead, we focus on explaining our 
novel measures of legislative and regulatory outputs, and some of the previously undocumented 
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patterns that emerge from our data. Their full implications for the study of Chinese law and politics must 
be left to future analysis.  
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides institutional background regarding 
the following: subnational lawmaking in China; the distinctions among statutes, formal regulations, and 
IPDs and their legal significance; and the reasons for viewing Chinese legislation through the lens of 
parliamentary polities. It also stresses the importance of the question: Why do Chinese politicians make 
law at all? Section 2 describes our data and discusses summary statistics. Section 3 presents evidence for 
the division of labor between provinces and cities. Section 4 describes the matches between policy types 
and the level of formality. Section 5 sets out evidence for the apparent irrelevance of political career 
considerations for lawmaking. Section 6 explores correlations between the quantity of law and general 
economic and demographic variables. Finally, Section 7 reviews the findings of the previous sections and 
discusses implications for research on Chinese law and politics as well as policy implications. The 
Conclusion discusses directions for further research.       
1. Subnational Lawmaking in China  
 
The analyses in this paper require a clear answer at the outset to the question: What constitutes 
“law” in China? Both within the Chinese government and among Chinese public law scholars, the answer 
is unambiguous. The Law on Legislation (2000) effectively lays out the “rules of recognition” for the 
Chinese legal system, and prescribes a hierarchy of general rules that have the force of law, as well as 
general principles regarding how they should be made. The Administrative Litigation Law (1989) 
instructs courts to apply essentially the same range of rules, so Chinese “law” is, consistent with usage 
elsewhere, what formally binds Chinese courts. The same concept of law is also reflected in many other 
statutes and in government practice, all with remarkable consistency. According to this concept, at 
subnational levels,5 lawmaking can take two forms. At the provincial level, all People’s Congresses may 
adopt local statutes (difangxing fagui), and People’s Governments6 (PGs) may adopt local government 
regulations (difang zhengfu guizhang). At the prefectural/city (di/shi) level—a level of government 
between the province and the county—only 49 cities out of a total of 333 jurisdictions had lawmaking 
power before 2015.7 In these cities, PCs may adopt local statutes, and PGs local government regulations, 
just like their provincial counterparts. Therefore, both parliamentary and executive bodies can make 
law, although at a given level of government, parliament-made laws (i.e. statutes) tend to have superior 
force over executive-made ones (i.e. regulations).  
 
The basic clarity of the Law on Legislation’s “rules of recognition”, however, has been obscured 
by a common government practice that creates much confusion. Chinese executive branch entities (at 
both national and subnational levels) regularly announce general rules and policies intended to be 
                                                 
5 At the national level, the NPC enacts statutes (falü); the State Council enacts “administrative statutes” (xingzheng 
fagui); and national ministries enact ministerial regulations (bumen guizhang). The State Council and national 
ministries also issue IPDs. The distinction between formal regulations and IPDs also applies at the national level. 
6 The People’s Government of any given geographic jurisdiction represents the central executive branch office for 
that jurisdiction. A provincial (city) PG is headed by the Governor (Mayor) and a group of Vice Governors (Mayors), 
just as the central government’s State Council is headed by the Premier and Vice Premiers. This central office at 
any given level is distinct from specialized agencies at the same level, much like the national ministries are distinct 
entities from the State Council. 
7 As a result of the revision of the Law on Legislation in 2015, this number increased to 322. 
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enforced and complied with. However, few of them are promulgated as formal regulations. Most of 
these are adopted without the formal procedures stipulated by the Law on Legislation and are better 
labeled as informal policy directives (IPDs). Distinguishing between formal regulations (guizhang) and 
IPDs (qita guifanxing wenjian or “other normative documents”) is a fundamental precept in Chinese 
administrative law: according to the Law on Legislation, the Administrative Litigation Law, and other 
statutes, the former has the force of law and the latter does not. This dichotomy is the Chinese version 
of a distinction that is almost universal among modern administrative states.8 But perhaps not unlike 
analogous distinctions in other legal systems, it is lost on many citizens and even legal practitioners.9 It is 
often falsely assumed that most of the rules promulgated by the executive branch are regulations, when 
in fact very few of them are (as documented in Section 2.a below).  
 
In Appendix 1, we set out some of the key features of formal regulations in China that 
distinguish them from IPDs and render them much more analogous to statutes. For the purposes of our 
empirical analyses, the distinction means that in studying executive branch lawmaking, regulations 
should count as lawmaking while IPDs should not.10  
 
Drawing a clear distinction between formal regulations and IPDs is not just an issue of 
measurement. It highlights an important question about the incentives for lawmaking. As we 
demonstrate below, even the core executive branch offices in China adopt very few formal regulations 
relative to IPDs. Government leaders simply informally announce commands, decisions, and directives 
and expect them to be implemented by subordinate bureaucrats and backed by the coercive power of 
the state. Many factors may explain this phenomenon. From a legal perspective, it is important to note 
but the Chinese judiciary operates by design as a civil law judiciary. In contrast to courts in common law 
systems, Chinese courts are supposed to apply the law instead of make law, and judicial decisions 
generally have no precedential value. When courts are not expected to make law, they should also not 
be expected to repudiate executive directives unless the latter are strictly in conflict with existing law. 
Consequently, the failure to pursue an item of policy through formal lawmaking, for the most part, does 
not prevent the policy from being implemented; simply put, it would not automatically be challenged in 
court.  
 
The above discussion may seem to suggest that the distinction between formal regulations and 
IPDs does not matter. This may be true if one is only interested in the practical effects of the various 
policy instruments. But the conclusion is wrong when looking at the issue from a social science 
perspective, which begs the question: given the ease of implementing policy through IPDs, why do 
Chinese politicians pursue formal lawmaking—whether in the form of regulations or statutes—at all? 
When making law is largely unnecessary, why does law get made?  
 
                                                 
8 In the U.S. federal government, formal regulations are closely associated with the notice and comment procedure 
under the Administrative Procedure Act, which in turn is closely associated with the standard of judicial review set 
out in the Supreme Court’s 1984 Chevron decision. See, e.g. Merrill and Hickman 2001, Pierce and Hickman 2018, 
and Sunstein (forthcoming). The practice of informal agency guidance and the judicial review of such practice, on 
the other hand, are quite different. See Hickman and Krueger 2007 and Epstein 2016.  
9 What is perhaps different from other jurisdictions is that many scholars of Chinese law often neglect this 
distinction. For recent scholarship emphasizing the distinction, see, e.g. Howson 2012 and Cui 2011.  
10 To put it differently, lawmaking in China occurs in the executive as well as in the parliamentary branch; however, 
much of what is casually assumed to be lawmaking in the executive branch is not. 
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It would be wrong to sweep this question aside by assuming that law is made only by 
parliamentary bodies, i.e. it is the job of PCs to make law, why they do so is not a meaningful question.11 
This position is untenable, however, for two reasons. The first is that, like modern administrative states 
elsewhere (Dubash and Morgan 2013; Potter and Shipan 2019), much Chinese law gets made in the 
executive branch.12 Second and perhaps more importantly, regarding People’s Congresses as uniquely 
important sites of lawmaking is problematic because the Chinese government is structured as a 
parliamentary system. Unlike presidential systems (exemplified by U.S. federal and state governments) 
in which the chief executive and Congress represent co-equal branches of government, executive branch 
leaders in parliamentary systems also lead the parliament, and therefore tend to more freely impose 
their will on the latter.  
 
This second point deserves some elaboration. China’s nominally democratic political institutions 
are designed to resemble parliamentary systems. PCs are either directly elected or elected by delegates 
from lower-level PCs, and once these parliamentary bodies are formed, they elect the heads of the PGs 
(i.e. the executive branch) in their respective jurisdictions.13 The nominal power of the parliament to 
appoint or remove the heads of the executive branch underlies the concept of “parliamentary 
supremacy”.14 However, we know that even in modern democracies, parliamentary supremacy does not 
imply that the parliament competes with and constrains the executive. Instead, the head of the 
executive branch is often the leader of the winning political party (or coalition), whose political power 
far exceeds the parliamentary members of his or her party (Huber and Shipan 2002; Docherty 1997; 
Docherty 2005). Therefore it is the cabinet, not parliament, which dominates lawmaking; the cabinet 
proposes most bills, and parliament’s ability to independently propose or amend legislation is 
comparatively weak. One observes a similar pattern in China. All scholars studying Chinese legislation 
agree that legislative proposals overwhelmingly originate from the executive branch, and that 
parliamentarians rarely block proposals advanced by the executive branch (Dowdle 1997; Tanner 1999; 
Potter 2003). However, this pattern is far from being unique to China’s autocratic regime; the same is 
also observed in majority-controlled parliamentary democracies. The function of Communist Party 
control can be analogized to a party in a parliamentary democracy with a secure majority control 
combined with very strong party discipline.  
 
 We highlight this (perhaps imperfect) analogy between China’s formal legislative system and 
parliamentary democracies because it suggests an important perspective for analyzing lawmakers’ 
incentives. From this perspective, the same set of actors face a choice among a variety of instruments 
for implementing policy. A politician leading the executive branch—whether he is a provincial governor, 
a city mayor, or a Party secretary at either level—can propose legislation to the parliament in his 
jurisdiction in the hope of giving statutory form to a policy. Alternatively, he can simply adopt a formal 
regulation, which also possesses formal legal effect and is binding on courts, without coordinating with 
parliamentary bodies.  Finally and most importantly, he can eschew formalities altogether and 
                                                 
11 Actually, most PCs in China do not have lawmaking power, so it is not true that it is the job of PCs to make law. 
Consistently with this, PCs are often studied as sites of representations independently of their legislative activities 
(or lack thereof). Hence the study of lawmaking has mostly featured only as a branch of the study of PCs.  
12 At both national and subnational levels, the quantities of formal regulations are comparable to or exceed those 
of statutes. 
13 Constitution of the People's Republic of China (as last amended in 2018), Ch III. 
14 Ibid., Art 2 and 57. “Parliamentary supremacy” is also reflected in the legislative system, in that statutes have 
superior legal force over regulations adopted by the executive branch and can never be overridden by the latter.  
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implement policy through issuing IPDs. Which of these instrument types he chooses should depend on 
their relative benefits and costs. In other words, one can examine the incentives for lawmaking by 
examining preferences revealed through choices among policy instrument types. 
 
 This perspective points to studying statutes, formal regulations and IPDs alongside one another. 
Such a comparison could generate insights that would not otherwise be apparent. We take this 
approach, as it has the advantage not only of (i) not overemphasizing the role of the parliamentary 
branch in examining lawmaking, but also of permitting us (ii) to identify policy priorities through the 
examination of IPDs, and (iii) to detect differences between formal and informal policy instruments.15  
 
 We have so far focused on the characters of different legal and policy outputs from Chinese 
subnational governments. What about the institutions and processes for producing statutes, 
regulations, and IPDs? While there are interesting features to these institutions and processes, for our 
purposes the most important point is that they are the same across China. The procedures for making 
statutes, FRs and IPDs are essentially identical among provinces and cities. The technologies for the 
production of formal law and most informal policies can thus be held constant when examining 
subnational variations. This makes it more reasonable to attribute subnational variations in lawmaking 
outcomes to varying demands for, rather than varying supplies of, law.  
 
 With that said, the process for making statutes, regulations, and IPDs at subnational levels can 
be summarized as follows. Most legislative proposals come to a local PC from the executive branch, i.e. 
the mayor or governor. Some important legislations are supervised by the jurisdiction’s Communist 
Party Committee, in which case the local Party Secretary may also be important. At the PC of a province 
or of a city authorized to make law, typically a committee comprising of congressional members and a 
Legal Affairs Commission (a subordinate bureaucratic body) engage in the review of proposed 
legislation. But unlike parliaments designed to be co-equal branches with the executive, both the 
capacity and incentives for congressional review and drafting are limited. 
 
 Within the executive branch, the chief executive’s office is assisted by a Legislative Affairs Office 
(LAO) in designing plans for legislation and in drafting legislative proposals. This office typically draws on 
expertise from specialized regulatory agencies. The same office is also responsible for organizing the 
drafting of formal regulations, which the chief executive would approve and promulgate. The offices of 
governors and mayors also issue many IPDs. IPDs from a chief executive office may or may not draw on 
agency expertise, depending on the substance of the IPD. The LAO also may or may not be involved in 
IPD issuance.  
 
Finally, many government agencies in provinces and cities (as opposed to provincial or city PGs) 
also issue numerous IPDs, but they do not have the power to make formal law. They must lobby the 
chief executive to either adopt a formal regulation or propose a statute to the local PC. It is this selection 
process that ensures that formal law tends to reflect the incentives of local political leaders, and not just 
the incentives and expediencies of the bureaucrats in specialized agencies. We exclude all agency IPDs 
from the scope of our study and focus on IPDs issued by governors’ or mayors’ offices, as only these IPDs 
shed light on the incentives of lawmakers.  
                                                 
15 Strong differences between formal and informal policy instruments, such as those we discuss in Section 4, also 
lead us to reject a certain kind of agnosticism about the definition of law in China, which would treat an indefinite 
range of executive branch pronouncements as law. 
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2. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
a. Data Construction  
 
In 2000, the NPC enacted the Law on Legislation and fundamentally clarified the scope of law in 
China. In 2015, the same statute was amended to permit almost all prefectural cities in China to make 
law. Using the legal database Chinalawinfo, we gathered data for the 2000 to 2015 period on lawmaking 
in all of China’s 31 provinces as well as the 49 cities that had legislative power during this time.16 Our 
dataset thus covers the (i) enactment of local statutes (LS) by China’s 31 provincial PCs and the PCs in 49 
cities; and (ii) the adoption of FRs by the PGs of the same provincial and city jurisdictions. To shed light 
on formal lawmaking, we also collected (iii) the large volume (>160,000) of IPDs issued by the same 
executive entities in (ii). Appendix 2 provides further details regarding our data collection.  
 
The main issue of note regarding data construction is that while identifying LSs and FRs is 
straightforward, identifying and counting IPDs is not. This is because the line between IPDs and 
government internal documents with no policy significance is blurry. Since 2005 (and especially 2008, 
when China enacted new open government information (OGI) regulations), the volume of publicly 
available IPDs increased substantially, which cannot be attributed to increases in policy announcements. 
We discuss this issue in detail in Appendix 2. We try to mitigate this concern in several ways. First, we 
manually classified the IPDs according to their titles, which identified a substantial fraction of 
government documents that lack policy significance (e.g. those relating to personnel). Second, as a 
result of the extensive classification exercise, we can confirm that a very high percentage of PG 
documents included in the Chinalawinfo database represents policy announcements. Third, the 
noisiness of IPD counts mainly affect our analyses of the correlates of the volume of policy 
announcements (Section 6), and the relationship of these announcements to political careers (Section 
5). It affects our study of specialization between provinces and cities and of the choice between formal 
and informal instruments (sections 3-4) to a much lesser extent. Finally, while OGI initiatives in recent 
years increased the problem of noise, insofar as such an increase is similar across most local 
governments, year fixed effects in our regression analysis partially address the problem (as well as other 
problems of nationally-uniform changes in measurement).  
 
After collecting 16 years of subnational legal and regulatory outputs of parliaments and core 
executive offices, we classified them into 39 topic categories. Appendix 3 sets out our classification 
scheme. While there is no “correct” scheme of classification, we believe ours is at once sufficiently 
detailed to convey strong intuitions about the topics involved, and not too detailed so as to render it 
difficult to make generalizations.  
 
 We also gathered economic and demographic data about the jurisdictions we study from 
standard sources. Finally, to test the relevance of individual politicians’ incentives, for each of the 
provincial or city PGs we examine, we located the identities of the pair of top political leaders in each 
year: a province’s Governor and Communist Party Secretary, or a city’s Mayor and Party Secretary. 
Based on this data, we assign to each jurisdiction-year a pair of numbers that represents the length, up 
to that year, that each of the two political leaders has occupied that particular office.  
 
                                                 
16 Restricting our data to after 2000 allows us to rely on the criteria of what counts as law stipulated in the Law on 
Legislation. Restricting our data to before 2016 allows us to focus on cities that have had decades of experience in 
making law, as opposed to those just beginning to make law in 2016.  
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b. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Table 1 provides summary statistics for our main dependent and independent variables. In 
terms of the dependent variables, at the median a provincial PG issues 9 formal regulations a year but 
147 IPDs, and a city PG issues 5 formal regulations and 78 IPDs a year. Informal policy instruments 
clearly dominate formal ones in the executive branch. In terms of legislation, at the median, each year a 
Chinese provincial PC enacted 13 statutes, while a city PC enacted 4.17 Figure 1 presents the national 
trend in subnational lawmaking in the period we examine. Statutory enactments are cyclical and follow 
the same cycles at the provincial and city levels, and even provincial regulations seem affected by such 
cycles. Overall the quantity of formal lawmaking displays no increase (and even a slight decrease) over 
time. By contrast, the quantity of IPDs rose dramatically until 2008, likely reflecting the effect of OGI 
initiatives.  
 
Figure 2 provides an initial look at the policy priorities of subnational governments in China. 
Here, we measure priorities in terms of national aggregates: the priority of topic A for all provincial 
statutes is defined by a fraction, the numerator of which is the total number of provincial statutes 
devoted to topic A during the 16-year period, and the denominator of which is the total number of 
provincial statutes enacted in this period. Such fractions are computed separately for LS, FR, and IPD, 
and separately for provinces and cities. Figure 2, panel (a) shows that 10% to 15% of IPDs relate to 
bureaucratic appointments (“personnel”), but this topic appears with much lower frequency among LSs 
and FRs. All other categories, however, appear to capture genuine policy content. For a number of the 
topics, the divergence in priority between provinces and cities is also visible. In Sections 3 and 4, we will 
explore patterns in policy priorities at the individual jurisdiction level.  
3. Vertical Divisions of Labor in Policymaking  
 
We first examine evidence that provincial governments in China specialize in different policy 
areas from city governments. The division of policy focus between different tiers of government in China 
is notoriously unclear. De jure, the central government reserves lawmaking power for itself in several 
policy areas (e.g. the structure of basic state institutions, criminal law, taxation, expropriation of 
property, dispute resolution, and international affairs), but explicit divisions of labor in other policy 
spheres are hard to find. De facto, most policies are implemented by government entities at county or 
lower levels. As Chinese provincial governments are generally thinly staffed, they engage in little direct 
public goods provision or direct law enforcement. Consequently, from a legal perspective, provincial and 
city governments exercise concurrent jurisdiction in most policy areas; provincial governments may 
insist on issuing commands, but often leave many gaps in policy guidance.  
 
 Social scientists have tended to study policy priorities in China according to expenditure 
allocations (e.g. Balla 2017). However, in any government, expenditure decentralization is complex 
because of the variety of transfer payments subject to different degrees of top-down control. Budgetary 
classifications are also far more rudimentary than regulatory divisions of labor. Our decomposition of 
provincial and city policy documents according to a detailed classification regime thus promises to shed 
novel light on the division of responsibilities between provinces and cities.  
                                                 
17 The NPC during the same period enacted 14 statutes in a median year, so provincial PCs are roughly as active in 
the legislative sphere as the NPC. 




 For each of the 49 cities, we calculate the difference between the proportion, of the total 
number of a given type of policy instrument (LS, FR or IPD), that the city devotes to a given topic, and 
the same proportion devoted by the government of the province in which the city is located.18 A positive 
difference indicates a greater focus on the policy by the city, while a negative difference indicates a 
greater focus on the policy by the province. The frequency distribution of such differences captures 
whether such divisions of labor are common across the country. Table 2 provides numerical summaries 
of city-province comparisons for all 39 policy topics. The figures in Appendix 4 visualize such divisions of 
labor. 
 
Figure 1 of Appendix 4 displays topics in which cities specialize, defined as those topics on which 
cities tend to devote greater proportions of all three policy instrument types.19 These include urban 
affairs, environment, construction and real estate, public health, transportation, and takings and 
relocation. It may seem intuitive for cities with dense populations and active urban development to 
focus on these matters. Note, however, that almost all rural areas in China are administratively allocated 
to the jurisdiction of cities, and cities are simply higher units of administration that encompass both 
rural counties and urban districts. So what Figure A.1 really displays is the greater urban bias of city 
governments as compared to provincial governments.20     
 
Figure 2 of Appendix 4 illustrate policy areas of relative provincial specialization, again defined 
as subjects to which provinces devote greater attention across all policy instruments. Some of the topics 
confirm the relative urban bias of cities; provinces clearly dominate in policymaking in relation to the 
non-urban subjects of agriculture, minerals and energy, and water and irrigation. Provinces’ greater 
activity in tax and public finance is consistent with China’s high degree of centralization in tax policy. 
Interestingly, provinces also lead in the areas of labor and employment regulation, intellectual property 
and competition, population and marriage, sports, education, and the regulation of organizations.   
 
We only compare the policy priorities of 49 cities in China with their respective provinces. Can 
one extrapolate the findings here to all of the other cities in China—those that, prior to 2015, possessed 
no lawmaking power and therefore were able to issue their own policies only through IPDs? Our 
definition of specialization in terms of greater policy attention across policy instrument types offers 
some comfort. It seems unlikely that provinces that dominate policymaking in a given policy area vis-à-
vis those cities in it that can make law would cede such policy leadership to its other cities that lacked 
lawmaking power.  
 
Greater provincial or city attention to a policy subject is not always uniform across policy 
instruments. In the areas of food and drugs regulation, regulation of markets, social security, 
management of state assets, provinces dominate in legislation, but cities are ahead in the issuance of 
formal regulations and IPDs. In public safety and social assistance, provinces lead in the enactment of 
both statutes and regulations, but lag behind cities in the issuance of IPDs (see Table 2). The reverse 
pattern is less common for cities: culture, history and heritage is the only policy topic where cities have a 
                                                 
18 All proportions are calculated for the entire 2000-2015 period, given the low count of statutes and regulations 
for any single year. 
19 That is, we require specialization to manifest across policy instrument types: if a city specializes in one of these 
topics in enacting statutes, it also tends to do so in adopting FRs and IPDs. 
20 The specialization of cities on environmental regulation is somewhat surprising, especially given that 
environmental protection is a top regulatory subject for both cities and provinces (Figure 2). 
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lead in legislation but lags behind provinces in issuing either regulations or IPDs. One possible 
explanation for this is that once a parliamentary body (e.g. a provincial PC) enacts a statute, it often 
delegates responsibility to the executive branch to enforce it. The provincial executive offices may 
further delegate enforcement to lower-tier executive agencies. IPDs from the city executive branch may 
result from such delegation following the enactment of provincial legislation. In contrast, it is unlikely for 
a city legislature to respond to provincial-level executive orders.      
 
Building on these findings, in the next section we explore more directly Chinese politicians’ 
choices between formal and informal policy instruments. We show, first, that despite the differences 
between provinces and cities identified so far, certain policy subjects seem to dictate similar provincial 
and city choices between formality and informality. In addition, greater focus by a given level of 
government on a topic is more likely to lead to investment in formal lawmaking.  
4. The Choice between Formal versus Informal Instruments 
 
For any given policy subject and given type of policy instrument (LS, FR, or IPD), we again 
calculate the ratio of that type of policy instrument devoted to the subject to the total number of that 
type of policy instruments adopted in a jurisdiction from 2000 to 2015. For each policy topic, we then 
compute (i) the excess of the proportion of LSs devoted to it over the proportion of IPDs devoted to it in 
a jurisdiction, and (ii) a similar excess of FRs over IPDs. In Figure 3, we plot, for each 37 topics,21 the 
distribution of jurisdictions based on the resulting pair of values. All observations to the right of the 
vertical axis represent jurisdictions that devoted a greater proportion of LSs to a topic than IPDs. All 
observations above the horizontal axis, meanwhile, represent jurisdictions that devoted a greater 
proportion of FRs to the topic than IPDs. For any topic that has a concentration of observations in the 
first quadrant, one can say that formality dominates. Conversely, for any topic that has a concentration 
of observations in the third quadrant, informality dominates. Provincial and city observations are 
plotted in the same graphs using different colors. 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates clear biases towards formality or informality for some topics. There are 
three notable patterns. First, in the areas of regulation of markets, the regulation of general services, 
transportation, public safety, environmental regulation, population and marriage, and construction and 
real estate, the first quadrant has the highest concentration of observations, and few observations lie in 
the third quadrant.22 Notably, this bias towards formality is shared between provinces and cities. 
Second, going to the other end of the spectrum (the last two pages of graphs of Figure 3), for the topics 
of management of state assets, tax and public finance, economic development, social security, medical 
and healthcare, food and drugs regulation, and the regulation of the financial sector,23 informality 
dominates, again in both provinces and cities. Third, there are a number of topics for which provinces 
and cities appear to differ (to a visible extent) on their preferences for formality or informality. For 
                                                 
21 For comparing policy priorities across instrument types, we remove two topics from consideration, since keeping 
them would suppress the fractions observed for other topics. In computing IPD fractions, we remove “personnel” 
from the total (denominator), as this topic is little represented in FR and LS. Similarly, in computing FR and LS, we 
leave out “archiving and cancelling documents”. 
22 We plot the simple algebraic difference between fractions. If topic A accounts for 7% of LS, for example, whereas 
the it accounts for 2% of IPD, then the difference comes out visualization as 0.05. But in this case IPDs are 70% less 
likely than LS to cover topic A. 
23 Several other more obscure topics are also found in this group. Little policymaking is observed on the topics of 
foreign affairs and trade, as can be expected for subnational governments.  
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policies pertaining to social assistance, regulation of organization, agriculture, and labor and 
employment, cities opt for informality significantly more than provinces. In contrast, for the topics of 
urban affairs and education, cities opt for formality much more than provinces, even though the general 
bias—formality for urban affairs and informality for education—is preserved at both levels.  
  
We believe that each of these three patterns can be explained. We begin with formality. Under 
Chinese law, there is no explicit legal requirement for policies to be implemented through formal 
lawmaking in any of the subject areas where formality appears to dominate. One plausible explanation 
for the prevalence of formality in these areas is that there are strong needs for relevant policies to 
become public and common knowledge. Enforcement by public agents alone would not suffice for rules 
on environmental protection, public safety, transportation, construction and real estate, and the 
regulation of businesses offering other services and of markets generally.  One might say that these 
policy areas are inherently “public facing”. The promulgation of policies in these spheres through formal 
procedures has the unique ability to provide the publicity that the rules are likely to require, while IPDs, 
though much less costly to promulgate, would not allow for similar benefits. 
 
A competing explanation for formality is that in those areas in which a high level of compliance 
is desired, not only is public knowledge required, but the threat of sanctions for contravention is also 
beneficial. The imposition of administrative penalties in China generally requires basis in formal law. 24 
Therefore it may be that policymakers have no choice but to resort to formal legal instruments when 
they desire to back policies by formal sanctions. If policies that require wide compliance are associated 
with the need both for public knowledge and for formal sanctions, it may seem unclear which factor 
drives the choice of formality. While this objection is intelligible, it can be countered by the fact that in 
practice, the imposition of penalties provided by law is infrequent in China (partly because of procedural 
requirements associated with the Administrative Penalty Law). Government employees tend to resort to 
other means of coercion or persuasion to secure compliance from regulated subjects. Knowing this, the 
expectation that additional compliance will be secured by virtue of formal sanctions should not be high. 
Therefore the benefit of formal lawmaking is not clear. It may be far more important for the public to 
know what the rules are. Thus, public knowledge of the possible application of sanctions is merely one 
component of the general publicity that certain policies require (and that formal lawmaking provides).   
 
Our explanation for the choice of informality complements the explanation for the choice of 
formality. In the policy topics dominated by informality, we observe either of two institutional 
arrangements. One is the presence of public ownership, as reflected not only in the management of 
state assets, but also in education, healthcare (and therefore also drugs) and financial services. The 
other is the involvement of bureaucratic internal coordination: emergency response, performance 
measurement, and the implementation of policies to promote economic development are key 
examples. Taxation and social security are two policy areas that combine features of both institutional 
settings.25 In both settings, policies matter more to bureaucrats and public employees than to the wide 
public; broad social compliance is less of an issue. For instance, as important as promoting economic 
development is to the Chinese government—nationally, it is the third most frequently appearing topic 
among IPDs—, it is not contingent on broad public compliance (or on the private enforcement of law). 
                                                 
24 Administrative Penalty Law (1996), Articles 11 and 13.   
25 It is important to emphasize that tax collection in China still relies very little on voluntary compliance with 
general rules: public, common knowledge about what tax rules apply is secondary to private knowledge about 
what frontline tax administrators may exact (Cui 2015).   
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Therefore, regardless of who adopts these rules—provinces or cities—informal implementation carries 
no disadvantage.  
 
 The third pattern in Figure 3 that requires explanation is the diverging choices between 
formality and informality among provinces and cities. In the last section, we have seen that social 
assistance, regulation of organization, agriculture, and labor and employment are areas in which 
provinces appear to be policy leaders—in terms of the use of all policy instruments. While these topics 
do seem to go beyond bureaucratic coordination and issues of the public sector, it may be unclear 
whether they are public-facing. An explanation of the province-city divergence may be that once 
provinces, as the policy leaders in them, pursue formal lawmaking, cities tend not to invest in formality 
on the same subjects. Conversely, we know that cities lead in policymaking regarding urban affairs. Even 
though the regulation of urban affairs seems already inherently public-facing, cities may invest more in 
formal lawmaking in this area than provinces by virtue of being policy leaders in it.26 In other words, 
where we do see city-province divergence, policy specialization may be a relevant explanation of who 
chooses formality; the choice may be a result of specialization (which itself is observed across policy 
instrument types).27 For most topics, however, the intrinsic nature of the subject seems to dictate 
similar choices for cities and provinces.   
5. Policymaking and Political Careers 
 
A key idea underlying our data construction is that political leaders have at their disposal three 
types of instruments for announcing policies. The enactment of statutes is not the action of some 
entirely independent political body that is entirely unrelated to the issuance of formal regulations and 
IPDs. This implies that the individual incentives of political leaders may affect the promulgation of all 
three types of instruments. Examining the incentives of the provincial and city Party Secretaries, 
governors, and mayors28 may provide insights into legislative processes more than studying the views of 
congressional members and legislative staff.29    
 
Indeed, political scientists have made a number of claims recently about observed correlations 
between politicians’ careers and policy outcomes in China. Guo (2009) argues that county political 
leaders time government expenditures in anticipation of increased chances of political promotion (in the 
3rd and 4th year in office). Yu et al. (2016) show that city political leaders near retirement no longer 
engage in public expenditure competition.30 One hypothesis, therefore, is that the promulgation of LS, 
FR, and IPDs may also reflect political cycles.  
 
However, the summary statistics in Table 1 show that the median tenure in office of mayors and 
city Party Secretaries is only 3 years, while the median tenure of provincial leaders lasts 4 years. 
                                                 
26 This is observed in Figure 3 to some extent in connection with some of the other areas of city specialization, too, 
e.g. construction and real estate.  
27 Education seems to present the only counterexample to this explanation. It is an area of provincial specialization, 
but cities opt for formal lawmaking on this topic more often than provinces.   
28 Chinese political leadership at the provincial and city levels is characterized by a well-known dyadic structure: 
the Party Secretary and Governor (Mayor) exercise dual leadership (Yao and Zhang 2015).  
29 For instances of the latter, see e.g. Manion 2015; Cui and Wan 2019. 
30 Lü and Landry 2014, using variation in space rather than over time, provide related evidence that political 
competition among county heads determines efforts in tax collection. 
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Typically, these political leaders get subsequently rotated to entirely different jurisdictions. One 
important value of making law is to implement long-term policy, especially since short-term policy 
objectives can be much more easily achieved through the less costly means of IPDs. In combination with 
short tenures in office, this implies that Chinese political leaders may lack incentives for lawmaking 
altogether: they rarely stay long enough to monitor the implementation of legislation they adopt and 
benefit politically from positive policy outcomes.  
 
To shed light on these considerations empirically, we regress the volumes of policymaking on 
politicians’ year of office, taking LSs, FRs, and IPDs as separate dependent variables.31 We control for 
jurisdiction and year fixed effects in all regressions.32 Figure 4 displays the predicted outcome of each 
individual year for four different types of politicians, with 5%-confidence-intervals also shown. While 
there are multiple incidents of a 3rd-year peak, the difference of 3rd-year outcomes from other years is 
not statistically significant. The only statistically significant differences among years are (1) the issuance 
of provincial IPDs by governors in their 1st year in office versus their 7th (or later) year, and (2) the 
adoption of city regulations by mayors in their 1st year in office versus their 7th (or later) year; in both 
cases, newer political leaders are more active. 
 
In half of China’s provinces, a convention prevails that the Party Secretary also serves as the 
Chairman of the provincial PC. We compare these provinces to those where there is no similar 
convention and the Party Secretary is generally a different person than the Congressional Chairman. 
There appears to be no difference in the level of legislation. The idea that the Communist Party controls 
legislation (and therefore may determine legislative volume) thus does not seem to be captured by such 
conventions of joint appointment.  
6. The Determinants of the Supply of Law 
 
Our final exercise explores the economic determinants of legal and policy outputs. A well-
established law and economic literature (Kaplow 1992; Kaplow 2012) posits that the socially optimal 
amount of legal rules (ex ante lawmaking) depends on the relative cost and benefits of enacting law ex 
ante as opposed to ex post. Some legal scholars (e.g. Davis 2006) have conjectured that this dependence 
may be manifest in actual observed quantities of law as well. In the empirical literature, Mulligan and 
Shleifer (2005) develop a fixed-cost model of regulation, and argue that jurisdictions with larger 
populations are more likely to adopt regulations. They test the hypothesis using cross-sectional data on 
the quantity of statutes (measured by kilobytes of text) adopted in 37 U.S. states from 2001 to 2003, 
and find that more populous states regulate more (and adopt the same type of regulation earlier). 
Moreover, specific types of regulation (e.g., labor regulation) are more extensive in more populous 
states. By contrast, income per capita, the proportion of the urban population, and the number of 
lawmakers do not affect the quantity of legislation. Fukumoto (2008) models the legislature as a utility-
maximizing monopoly that matches marginal benefit against the marginal cost of legislation. 
Socioeconomic and political changes increase the marginal benefit of law production, while low 
negotiation costs and ample legislative resources decrease its marginal cost. Fukumoto uses changes in 
inflation, GDP, and population to proxy for socioeconomic change, and the seat share of the governing 
party, the number of committees, and the number of veto players to proxy for the political cost of 
                                                 
31 All years in which a politician has stayed in the same office for more than 7 years is coded as year 7.  
32 Ideally, we would also control for politician fixed effects, but our sample is not sufficiently large to permit such 
analysis (the standard errors become even bigger). 
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enactment. Based on cross-sectional data for 42 countries and time series data from Japan, he finds 
partial support for the model, although population change does not seem to drive the amount of 
legislation.33 
 
Studying determinants of the supply of law faces at least two challenges.34 The first is justifying 
the measure of the quantities of law. To legal scholars especially, using the lengths of legal texts (as in 
Mulligan and Shleifer 2005) or the numbers of statutes and regulations (as in Fukumoto 2008, Potter 
and Shipan 2019, and our own study) to measure the quantity of law may seem crude. However, 
judgments about the quantity of law that do not take into account such measures may also be 
unreliable (and are made rather infrequently). Moreover, when the sample of law is sufficiently large, it 
is plausible that any draw from the sample would capture roughly similar distributions of the underlying 
“true quantities” of law, however that is conceived.35  
 
A second challenge is that, even accepting an economic model of lawmaking, both supply and 
demand may determine the quantity of law actually observed. Any claim for identifying a correlation 
between the demand for law and the actual observed quantity of law must assume that the supply of 
law is held constant, and vice versa. Past empirical analyses using cross-sectional or time-series data 
generally fail to provide plausible justifications for this assumption. Our data, by contrast, strongly 
supports such an assumption. The institutions for issuing LSs, FRs, and IPDs by provincial and city 
governments are basically identical across China, and were also essentially fixed during the 2000-2014 
period. Thus, to the extent that economic and demographic patterns affect the demand for law and can 
be expected to impact the quantity of law produced, one should be able to observe such effects in 
subnational variations and variations over time. The use of jurisdiction and year fixed effects should also 
address many concerns about omitted variables. Overall, our rich dataset seems to represent a marked 
improvement over previous empirical evidence assembled to test the determinants of the supply of law.  
 
To execute such a test, we regress the annual quantities of LSs, FRs, and IPDs observed in 
Chinese provinces and cities on an extensive set of independent variables. We adopt two different 
approaches to deal with the low annual count of LSs and FRs. First, we divide 16 years of observations 
for the dependent variables into four 4-year groups (2000 to 2003, and so on) and aggregate instrument 
counts for each period. We then use the means of the observed values of the independent variables for 
each 4-year period in regressions.36 Second, we use individual-year observations, and apply negative 
binomial regressions.  Tables 3 and 4 present the OLS regression results using the first method and with 
the independent variables in levels. In Tables 1 and 2 of Appendix 5, we present the negative binomial 
analysis with independent variables in logs. All regressions include jurisdiction and year fixed effects. 
 
                                                 
33 Both Mulligan and Shleifer 2005 and Fukumoto 2008 highlight (and cite other scholars who lament) the paucity 
of empirical research on legislative productivity, especially outside the United States. 
34 A third challenge poses less concern: causal impact may go in both directions between lawmaking and 
demographic change (and especially economic development). We generally know more about the determinants of 
the economic development than of legislation. Law is at most one among many causes of economic development, 
while little is known about any systematic determinants of the quantity of law. Therefore, any correlation between 
such quantity and economic/demographic variables can be informative as to the determinants of the former. 
35 For example, we count the number of LSs, FRs, and IPDs to measure the quantity of legal and policy output, and 
rely on the assumption (consistent with casual observation) that the word count of these types of documents has 
similar distributions across jurisdictions and years. 
36 We also try a permutation of different specifications using different combinations of logs and levels for the 
variables, and using first-year value rather than mean value for each 4-year period. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3467703 
 
16 
 The results are very mixed. The OLS regressions suggest that at the provincial level, population is 
a significant positive predictor of LSs, reinforcing Mulligan and Shleifer’s (2005) results. An increase of 1 
million people is associated with 3-6 more statutes during a 4-year period. At the city level, population is 
also positively correlated with formal lawmaking, but the relation is no longer statistically significant. 
Also consistent with Mulligan and Shleifer 2005, GDP is a weak predictor of lawmaking, and is 
significantly (and positively) correlated with statutes only at the city level. Perhaps surprisingly, other 
proxies for the level of economic development, such as the number of large industrial firms, FDI, and 
fixed assets investment, do not offer significant (or consistent) predictions. The same can be said about 
measures of urbanization (urban area and ratio of urban population.) Finally, while public expenditures 
and public sector employees (not including government employees) are weak predictors of any type of 
instrument, the size of government employees turns out surprisingly to be a negative predictor of all 
three types.   
 
 Similar mixed results are obtained (Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix 5) when we apply negative 
binomial regressions to individual year observations, and when we use independent variables in logs 
(thus measuring the responsiveness of the outcome variables to changes in the explanatory variables). 
One possibility is that many of the factors that one might hypothesize to generate demand for law are 
closely associated with regions in China, so that regional fixed effects are absorbing much of the impact 
of these factors.37 To test this possibility, we remove regional fixed effects. Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix 5 
show the results from OLS regressions. At the provincial level (Table 3 in Appendix 5), population does 
come out to be a stronger positive predictor of LS quantity (as well as of IPDs), and GDP is a strong 
positive predictor of FR quantity. Fixed asset investments strongly predict IPD quantity, while the 
negative impact of government employees on all three instruments is accentuated. However, adjusted 
R2 is significantly lower compared with the regressions using region fixed effects, indicating that omitted 
variables play a strong role. Moreover, at the city level (Table 4 in Appendix 5), removing region fixed 
effects yield significant coefficients with unexpected signs (e.g. population being a strong negative 
predictor of LS quantity, and GDP being strong negative predictors of all three instruments.) Again, 
including regional FE doubles the regression fit in most specifications. 
 
 In conclusion, especially given the plausibility of the assumption of identical production 
technologies for law across Chinese subnational governments, our evidence casts significant doubt on 
the (otherwise rather appealing) idea that the quantity of law is a straightforward function of the 
demand for law, as measured by standard economic and demographic variables.38   
7. Discussion and Policy Implications 
 
 Our analyses of the legislative and regulatory outputs in Chinese provinces and select cities are 
preliminary and only descriptive, but we believe they suggest important new ideas for studying Chinese 
law and politics. For illustration, this section discusses three implications of our study. 
 
a. Is There Even Rule by Law? 
 
                                                 
37 The region FEs captures the average within-region variation of each explanatory variable. 
38 The mixed results also suggest that there is no single proxy for government size—the size of the budget, the 
quantities of formal and informal policy announcements, and the size of bureaucratic personnel seem to not even 
be positively correlated with one another.  
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 Especially given that a legal system barely existed at the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, 
China is often applauded for having rapidly built a national legal apparatus to aid its economic 
development (Clarke et al. 2008). Recent scholarship on Chinese law and politics has instead 
emphasized that legal institutions and processes may implement a strategy of “rule by law” rather than 
norms of the rule of law. However, our study suggests that the reach of legal institutions and processes 
in China—i.e. the presence of rule by law or “thin” rule of law —may be substantially overestimated. 
That is, there is a risk that scholars have unjustifiably come to take the existence of basic legal ordering 
in China for granted. In emphasize how legal ordering in China may reflect authoritarian as opposed to 
democratic values (i.e. how does authoritarian legality differ from democratic legality? How are China’s 
authoritarian legislatures similar to or different from Western, democratic legislatures?) scholars may be 
setting aside more basic and radical differences between the non-rule-based style of governance in 
China and Western legal systems. 
 
Take, for example, the study in Lü et al. (2018) of coalition formation around the NPC’s 
enactment of 4 statutes regarding education during the period from 1983 to 2007. The authors suggest 
that (i) bureaucrats bargain with one another publicly in the legislative process, and (ii) logrolling—
trading of favors among different factions—may occur. While we do not question these 
characterizations of the NPC’s legislative process, it seems vital to understand why these legislative 
initiatives on education policy took place at all. As Section 4 shows, education is a policy area where we 
observe an extreme tendency towards informality: Chinese provinces especially, but to a slightly lesser 
extent cities as well, overwhelmingly prefer IPDs to formal legal instruments when promulgating 
education policy. This observation is also consistent with a finding in Cui (2019) that China’s Ministry of 
the Education is the least likely of all national ministries to adopt formal regulations in announcing 
policy.39 Both the national and subnational observations can be rationalized by the fact that the 
education sector in China is largely publicly owned and operated. Therefore most government policies 
can be implemented through informal policy instructions directly targeted at bureaucratic subordinates. 
There seems to be little downside in bypassing the legal system altogether.  
 
What, then, was really at stake in national education legislation?  Lü et al. (2018) mention in 
passing that some of the education legislation they study helped secure education financing. As Section 
4 also shows, public finance is another area where Chinese subnational governments strongly prefer 
informality.40 Thus the public finance aspect of national education statutes does not explain why 
legislation was pursued at all. It seems that considering the motivation for legislation would have shed 
useful light on the bargaining and logrolling Lü et al (2018) purport to find in the NPC legislative process. 
Indeed, the finding that once the government decides to legislate, the process bears some of the marks 
of political bargaining seems less significant than the decision to legislate in the first place. One cannot 
begin to look for explanation of the latter, however, if it is simply taken for granted.   
 
b. The Wisdom of Decentralizing Lawmaking 
 
 Section 4 showed that in many important policy areas (e.g. regulation of markets and of the 
environment, transportation, public safety, population and marriage, urban affairs, and construction 
and real estate), Chinese provinces and cities preferred the pursuit of formal lawmaking to the issuance 
of IPDs. This may potentially be explained by the fact that policy implementation in these areas 
                                                 
39 For each regulation, the ministry issues close to 300 IPDs. 
40 Cui (2019) shows that China’s Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation, next to the Ministry of 
Education, issues the least quantities of formal regulations relative to the quantities of IPDs.  
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intrinsically requires compliance from the public and enforcement by private as well as public agents. In 
Section 3, we also noted that some of these policy subjects—environmental regulation, urban affairs, 
and construction and real estate—represent areas of greater city specialization relative to provinces. 
This policy specialization was manifest across different types of policy instruments. 
 
 Prior to 2015, only 49 “relatively large cities” in China possessed authority to make law. It was 
not until the amendment of the Law on Legislation in 2015 that the remaining 85% of Chinese 
prefecture-level cities began to be allowed to make law. This, of course, did not mean that governments 
in these cities did not engage in policymaking or regulation. Instead, they did so bypassing the legal 
system.41 That is, before 2015, for the vast majority of cities in China, even if formal lawmaking was the 
socially optimal way of promulgating certain policies, it was not an option. There seems to be no need 
for a more decisive counterexample to the assumption that “rule by law” characterizes the operation of 
the Chinese state.   
 
The 2015 decentralization of lawmaking power followed a decision by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) in 2013 to encourage Chinese politicians to use law more often in policy experimentation 
(Cui and Wan 2019). The decision, however, was met with much pushback from national and provincial 
parliamentary bureaucrats who had enjoyed a monopoly over lawmaking power. Many even claimed 
that it was unnecessary to give cities lawmaking power, and that cities should be content with the 
supply of law from national and provincial levels. The evidence we present in Section 3, however, 
contradicts the idea that provinces supply enough law in all major policy areas. Moreover, the evidence 
in Section 4 supports the idea that lawmaking may sometimes be the most effective way to implement 
policy, implying that it was foolish to categorically withhold lawmaking power from so many city 
governments.  
 
c. How to Improve Lawmaking Incentives 
 
 Zhang and Ginsburg (forthcoming) recently argued that the CCP, under Xi Jinping’s leadership, 
has empowered rather than weakened China’s legal institutions. They appeal mainly to China’s judicial 
reform since 2013 (as well as the 2018 Constitutional amendment) to support their claim. We interpret 
Zhang and Ginsburg as arguing that the CCP has increasingly recognized the importance of “rule by law” 
for China’s governance needs, and agree with the implication of their argument that there is much room 
for furthering even just “rule by law” (as opposed to the rule of law) in China.  Indeed, the 
decentralization of lawmaking power in 2015, which makes “rule by law” possible for the first time for 
most Chinese city governments, is arguably just as compelling a piece of evidence for Zhang and 
Ginsburg’s conclusion as those that they adduce.  
 
 However, there is no reason to think that just because the CCP wants more “rule by law” 
(supposing that is the case), there will be more “rule by law”. We find little evidence that Chinese 
subnational politicians have much interest in making law in most policy areas. The much more common 
mode of policy promulgation and implementation is the issuance of IPDs, and it is illogical to treat 
governance by informal circulars as “rule by law”. IPDs violate the “rules of recognition” for the Chinese 
                                                 
41 The conflation of lawmaking with “regulation”, in the sense of government control over market and social 
activities, is prevalent both in China and elsewhere. Conceptually the two are entirely distinct. One can have an 
enormous amount of regulation, e.g. by subjecting all activities to government approval, while having little law; 
this happens when the standards by which the government approves or disapproves activities are left unstated. 
Conversely, one can also have a lot of law with little government intervention (Hadfield and Weingast 2014).   
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legal system stated in the Law on Legislation, and our very data collection effort has taught us how hard 
it is to determine whether some IPD has policy significance (whereas no such difficulty arises for statutes 
and regulations). IPDs are directed primarily at bureaucratic subordinates and lack the basic 
characteristics of legal rules (such as common knowledge). Crucially, when a government promulgates 
few formal statutes and regulations in favor of mostly IPDs, there is little that the Chinese civil law 
judiciary can apply as “law” in adjudication. The professionalization and empowerment of the judiciary 
thus has very clear limitations. When there is no “law” to be applied, very often the most sensible thing 
for even an experienced judge to do is to defer to policy discretion of government agencies. To put it 
differently: without someone supplying the rules, adjudicators lacking the authority to make rules have 
no power to bring the governance of rules, as opposed to the governance of men.    
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we examine the legal operations of China’s vast administrative state, a seriously 
understudied aspect of China’s legal system. We analyze the legal and policy output generated from 
2000 to 2015 by 31 provincial governments, as well as 49 prefectural governments that possessed 
formal lawmaking power during this period. Our study expands, at a most basic level, the scope of 
existing knowledge about the Chinese legal system. There is little existing information on how much—
and what kind of—law is being made in subnational jurisdictions in China, even though lower levels of 
the Chinese government carry out the bulk of government activities. Our presentation of such data fills 
crucial gaps in existing research. 
 
 Our descriptive exercise also aims at highlighting the importance of the question: why do 
Chinese politicians bother to make law at all? We believe this question is of first-order importance, 
because, contrary to the approach of most existing scholarship on Chinese law and politics, the supply of 
law in China cannot be taken for granted. Tackling this complex question, however, is also difficult. We 
did not find straightforwardly interpretable relationships between what might be postulated as proxies 
for the demand for law and the quantity of law, nor any clear impact of political leaders’ career cycles. 
However, we did find biases towards and against legal formalities in different policy areas, and consider 
such findings a promising starting point for further exploration.   
 
 There are many questions that await further study based on our novel dataset. As mentioned in 
the Introduction, it would be useful to explore causal determinants of legislation as opposed to mere 
correlations with economic and demographic variables. A related topic that we have left to future 
research is the interaction between national and subnational legislation. A significant portion of Chinese 
national legislation delegates some further policymaking to provincial governments, so at least 
provincial lawmaking may be in part a function of national lawmaking, which is something we intend to 
investigate. Finally, the existing literature on Chinese legislatures places great emphasis on legislative 
processes, even though this often comes at the expense of the breadth of the data. It would be 
interesting to combine the study of legislative processes with the panel structure of our data so as to 
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Table 1
Variables N Mean Median P25 P75 Max Min Sd
A. City level
Local statues 784 6.210 4 3 7 77 0 6.364
Formal regulations 784 6.758 5 3 9 38 0 5.545
Informal policy directives 783 93.65 78 20 130 432 0 83.83
Population (millions) 768 5.219 5.505 2.943 7.105 12.28 0.739 2.608
GDP (100 thousands of millions) 768 2.609 1.623 0.781 3.410 18.10 0.0920 2.757
Ratio of Urban Population (%) 637 53.13 48.51 41.37 64.21 100 18.02 18.34
Urban area (00s Sq. km) 670 2.244 1.790 1.210 2.750 10.24 0.340 1.553
Total area (00s Sq. km) 768 123.1 109.1 74.34 137.9 531 2.360 95.41
Above size ind. firms (00s) 768 18.96 11.19 5.165 23.57 137.2 1.150 21.50
Public expenditure (100 millions) 700 307.6 186.7 83.57 406.2 3,522 14.73 336.9
FDI (100 millions) 717 14.22 6.156 1.620 19.63 140.0 0 19.69
Public sector employees (10,000s) 768 89.42 74.69 46.25 114.4 536.1 18.19 64.42
Assets (100 thousands of millions) 618 1.087 0.602 0.230 1.500 6.808 0.0224 1.213
Mayor tenure 248 3.452 3 2 4 11 1 1.880
Party secretary tenure 236 3.754 3 2 5 10 1 1.930
B. Province level
Local statues 496 16.73 13 9 19 122 0 12.98
Formal regulations 496 12 9 6 14 182 0 12.11
Informal policy directives 496 175.2 147 109.5 219.5 523 16 95.67
Population (millions) 496 42.35 37.75 23.66 60.56 108.5 2.580 26.89
Population (millions) 496 42.35 37.75 23.66 60.56 108.5 2.580 26.89
GDP (100 thousands of millions) 496 27.04 20.73 10.41 36.75 108.0 2.759 21.34
Ratio of Urban Population (%) 279 49.71 47.20 40 56.02 89.60 20.85 14.92
Urban area (00s Sq. km) 409 12.09 8.647 5.237 13.55 139.7 0.690 16.03
Above size ind. firms (00s) 496 101.1 52.81 25.94 128.9 655.0 0.560 125.6
Public expenditure (100 millions) 496 1,923 1,188 519.9 2,972 12,828 59.97 1,870
FDI (100 millions) 466 43.64 19.38 3.672 61.21 357.6 0.000200 60.37
Public sector employees (10,000s) 404 211.2 190.6 144.1 282.4 542.1 13.66 110.0
Gov. employees (10,000s) 406 42.70 38.86 27.24 53.52 161 6.082 25.32
Lawyers per-millions of inhabitants 380 130.1 90.96 70.30 129.1 1,209 13.57 152.5
Assets (100 thousands of millions) 496 6.856 3.520 1.344 9.679 48.31 0.0640 7.953
Governor tenure 135 4.148 4 3 5 10 1 1.976
Party secretary tenure 138 4.101 4 3 5 14 1 2.229
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Table 2: Policy specialization as measured by city-province difference in proportions
Statutes Regulations IPDs
Subject <0 0 >0 <0 0 >0 <0 0 >0
Administration According to Law 29 0 20 24 1 24 21 0 28
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery 39 0 10 45 1 3 42 0 7
Archiving and Cancelling Documents 29 0 20 24 0 25 5 0 44
Construction and Real Estate 15 0 34 8 0 41 5 0 44
Culture, History, and Heritage 21 0 28 26 2 21 31 0 18
Economic Development 26 4 19 20 6 23 34 0 15
Education 23 0 26 29 5 15 45 0 4
Emergency Response 26 19 4 25 12 12 13 0 36
Environment 15 0 34 12 0 37 8 0 41
Finance 8 38 3 13 28 8 36 0 13
Food and Drugs 33 4 12 18 4 27 19 0 30
Foreign Affairs 20 29 0 6 35 8 32 1 16
General Services 26 0 23 23 0 26 29 0 20
IP and Market Competition 30 3 16 27 8 14 32 0 17
Labor and Employment 35 0 14 39 0 10 30 0 19
Legal Services 26 5 18 16 23 10 19 7 23
Letters and Visits 38 9 2 6 39 4 29 0 20
Manufacturing 30 13 6 22 18 9 24 0 25
Medical and Health Care 25 1 23 19 5 25 21 0 28
Minerals and Energy 31 0 18 36 3 10 39 0 10
Performance Measurement 1 44 4 12 33 4 18 1 30
Personnel 33 2 14 25 7 17 28 0 21
Population and Marriage 28 0 21 24 3 22 29 0 20
Public Health 17 4 28 20 0 29 22 0 27
Public Information 26 0 23 32 0 17 29 0 20
Public Safety 30 0 19 28 0 21 13 0 36
Regulation of Markets 34 0 15 18 0 31 14 0 35
Regulation of Organizations 39 0 10 37 0 12 23 0 26
Science and Technology 24 0 25 25 3 21 25 0 24
Social Assistance 40 0 9 41 1 7 21 0 28
Social Security 22 6 21 16 0 33 6 0 43
Sports 28 3 18 28 13 8 32 0 17
State Assets 28 7 14 21 5 23 18 0 31
Takings and Relocation 12 11 26 14 7 28 7 0 42
Tax and Public Finance 33 1 15 40 0 9 37 0 12
Trade 8 41 0 3 43 3 37 0 12
Transportation 20 1 28 22 0 27 16 0 33
Urban Affairs 1 0 48 5 0 44 7 0 42
Water Conservancy and Irrigation 24 0 25 30 11 8 31 0 18
We calculate the difference between a city’s proportion of an instrument devoted to a given topic and the proportion
observed in the province in which the city is located. Each entry reports the number of cities (out of 49) where
the difference is less or greater than or equal to zero.
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Table 3: Determinants of published policy documents: province level. OLS regressions.
LS FR IPD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Population (millions) 1.8316 2.9641* 3.5336* 6.6124* 1.3794 1.0811 1.0272 2.7721 -7.4001 -9.9148 -10.4799 -9.1180
[1.2507] [1.7257] [1.9547] [3.4277] [0.8146] [1.3248] [1.5269] [2.3586] [6.2445] [6.7286] [7.4678] [17.1360]
GDP (100 thousands of millions) -0.2346 -0.4388 -0.5677 -0.9646 -0.2330 -0.1426 -0.1687 0.2043 -0.8726 -3.0296 -2.2100 -5.1519
[0.3251] [0.4029] [0.4075] [1.0357] [0.3365] [0.4495] [0.4724] [0.3972] [3.1200] [2.4287] [3.0905] [4.9457]
Public expenditure (100 millions) 0.0039 -0.0012 0.0022 -0.0010 -0.0039 -0.0011 0.0559 0.0411 0.0359
[0.0077] [0.0093] [0.0104] [0.0062] [0.0067] [0.0089] [0.0484] [0.0505] [0.0901]
Gov. employees (10,000s) -1.6633** -1.4878* -3.4123*** 0.4401 0.4115 0.2686 -5.6335 -6.6055** -8.7473*
[0.7713] [0.7935] [0.7677] [0.5437] [0.4175] [0.7055] [3.3627] [2.8210] [5.0574]
Fixed asset investments (100 thousands of millions) -0.0003 1.1931 1.3904 0.0540 0.6635 1.1325 -0.9315 5.8983 6.3529
[1.4057] [1.5735] [2.4531] [1.3045] [1.5410] [1.8511] [9.2000] [11.1875] [18.3702]
Public sector employees (10,000s) 0.1910 0.2834 0.2270 0.3949 2.3539** 2.4275
[0.1459] [0.4152] [0.1419] [0.3099] [1.0264] [2.8539]
Above size ind. firms (00s) -0.0906 -0.1393 0.0085 -0.0481 0.0902 -0.3321
[0.0744] [0.1408] [0.0586] [0.0895] [0.4389] [0.6858]
FDI (100 millions) 0.0946 -0.3467 0.0358 -0.0788 -0.4217 0.3193
[0.2106] [0.2808] [0.1159] [0.1226] [1.4239] [2.6846]
Urban area (00s Sq. km) 1.3820** -2.9509*** -4.1620
[0.5875] [0.5332] [6.0397]
Ratio of Urban Population (%) -1.0511 2.0462* 5.0337
[2.2433] [1.1027] [9.3233]
Lawyers per-millions of inhabitants 0.0581 0.0228 0.6823
[0.0688] [0.0332] [0.6826]
Observations 124 116 116 86 124 116 116 86 124 116 116 86
Adj. R2 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.32 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.52 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.57
Results estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with region and year FEs. All variables are in levels. The sample contains 31 provinces and 16 years (2000-
2015). In IPD regressions, the subject Personnel Data is excluded when counting the total number of instruments of each province; while in LS-FR regressions,
the subject Archiving and Cancelling documents is excluded. Additionally, within each type of instrument, the top 1% of observations (region-year level) with
most documents are excluded from the regressions. Years are binned into 4 time periods: 2000-2003, 2004-2007, 2008-2011, 2012-2015. Dependent variables are
computed by adding the four years of each group. Independent variables are calculated by averaging the values of the correspondent variable within each time
period. Some independent variables data is not available for all the years, especially for 2014 and 2015. Those missing values cases are ignored when averaging
the variables. Hence, only if the four years of a time period are missing, the transformed observation is also considered as a missing value. *** p-value < 0.01, **
p-value < 0.05 and * p-value < 0.10. Clustered standard errors at the province level reported in brackets.
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Table 4: Determinants of published policy documents: city level. OLS regression
LS FR IPD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Population (millions) 0.6726 0.4211 5.0977 5.4149 -0.0119 -0.2685 0.0027 9.3537 23.3861 15.2561 32.7247 36.8170
[3.8102] [3.2426] [3.6441] [6.1877] [4.1935] [4.1501] [4.1607] [5.5826] [60.7681] [64.3145] [68.7160] [91.9352]
GDP (100 thousands of millions) -0.3283 -0.2052 4.1179** 3.6284 0.1127 0.3438 0.7901 1.6547 -5.0389 -14.0529 8.6760 -55.6509
[1.0778] [1.1872] [1.7505] [2.5439] [0.8216] [1.2437] [2.1027] [2.9056] [13.9183] [13.7725] [35.7576] [48.4168]
Above size ind. firms (00s) -0.0968 -0.1028 -0.0739 -0.1387 -0.1000 -0.0861 1.7885 1.8856 1.8088
[0.1373] [0.1174] [0.1521] [0.1287] [0.1369] [0.1492] [1.5461] [1.7170] [1.7673]
Public sector employees (10,000s) 0.0098 0.0256 -0.0515 0.0105 0.0117 -0.0532 0.2601 0.3915 1.7073*
[0.0875] [0.0566] [0.0520] [0.0469] [0.0474] [0.0432] [0.6431] [0.5834] [0.8721]
FDI (100 millions) 0.2802** 0.1928 -0.1445* 0.0164 0.0782 -2.3356
[0.1133] [0.1469] [0.0775] [0.0978] [1.8761] [1.7703]
Public expenditure (100 millions) -0.0378** -0.0098 0.0068 0.0389* -0.1997 0.0607
[0.0156] [0.0282] [0.0157] [0.0223] [0.4038] [0.5067]
Urban area (00s Sq. km) -6.7072* -7.8708 -2.3508 -5.1633 -17.9676 -23.0400
[3.9121] [5.0893] [3.1095] [3.3019] [31.7766] [32.7655]
Ratio of Urban Population (%) 0.2083 -0.0890 2.9314
[0.1732] [0.1928] [2.6853]
Fixed asset investments (100 thousands of millions) -1.0572 -6.7471** 79.5160
[2.6985] [2.5255] [48.8188]
Observations 192 192 192 164 192 192 192 164 192 192 192 164
Adj. R2 0.42 0.42 0.50 0.52 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.62 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.69
Results estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with region and year FEs. All variables are in levels. The sample contains 49 cities and 16 years (2000-2015).
In IPD regressions, the subject Personnel Data is excluded when counting the total number of instruments of each province; while in LS-FR regressions, the subject
Archiving and Cancelling documents is excluded. Additionally, within each type of instrument, the top 1% of observations (region-year level) with most documents
are excluded from the regressions. Years are binned into 4 time periods: 2000-2003, 2004-2007, 2008-2011, 2012-2015. Dependent variables are computed by adding
the four years of each group. Independent variables are calculated by averaging the values of the correspondent variable within each time period. Some independent
variables data is not available for all the years, especially for 2014 and 2015. Those missing values cases are ignored when averaging the variables. Hence, only if
the four years of a time period are missing, the transformed observation is also considered as a missing value. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05 and * p-value
< 0.10. Clustered standard errors at the city level reported in brackets.
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City level. 49 cases, with 6 negatives ( 12.24% ) and 19 positives ( 38.78% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 2 negatives (  6.45% ) and 21 positives ( 67.74% ).
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City level. 49 cases, with 7 negatives ( 14.29% ) and 23 positives ( 46.94% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 3 negatives (  9.68% ) and 19 positives ( 61.29% ).
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City level. 49 cases, with 2 negatives (  4.08% ) and 28 positives ( 57.14% ).
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City level. 49 cases, with 13 negatives ( 26.53% ) and 16 positives ( 32.65% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 5 negatives ( 16.13% ) and 18 positives ( 58.06% ).
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City level. 49 cases, with 5 negatives ( 10.20% ) and 26 positives ( 53.06% ).
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City level. 49 cases, with 7 negatives ( 14.29% ) and 13 positives ( 26.53% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 3 negatives (  9.68% ) and 16 positives ( 51.61% ).
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City level. 49 cases, with 7 negatives ( 14.29% ) and 26 positives ( 53.06% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 7 negatives ( 22.58% ) and 15 positives ( 48.39% ).












-.04 -.02 0 .02 .04
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 32 negatives ( 65.31% ) and 3 positives (  6.12% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 5 negatives ( 16.13% ) and 15 positives ( 48.39% ).











-.05 0 .05 .1 .15
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 4 negatives (  8.16% ) and 40 positives ( 81.63% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 5 negatives ( 16.13% ) and 15 positives ( 48.39% ).












-.1 0 .1 .2
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 34 negatives ( 69.39% ) and 5 positives ( 10.20% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 7 negatives ( 22.58% ) and 12 positives ( 38.71% ).












-.02 0 .02 .04 .06 .08
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 14 negatives ( 28.57% ) and 14 positives ( 28.57% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 9 negatives ( 29.03% ) and 12 positives ( 38.71% ).













-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 21 negatives ( 42.86% ) and 20 positives ( 40.82% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 11 negatives ( 35.48% ) and 12 positives ( 38.71% ).
Instruments subject: Public Information
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0 .02 .04 .06
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 11 negatives ( 22.45% ) and 8 positives ( 16.33% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 3 negatives (  9.68% ) and 9 positives ( 29.03% ).













-.05 0 .05 .1
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 19 negatives ( 38.78% ) and 7 positives ( 14.29% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 9 negatives ( 29.03% ) and 9 positives ( 29.03% ).












-.05 0 .05 .1
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 16 negatives ( 32.65% ) and 8 positives ( 16.33% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 12 negatives ( 38.71% ) and 8 positives ( 25.81% ).












-.02 -.01 0 .01 .02 .03
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 20 negatives ( 40.82% ) and 8 positives ( 16.33% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 10 negatives ( 32.26% ) and 8 positives ( 25.81% ).











-.1 -.05 0 .05
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 26 negatives ( 53.06% ) and 1 positives (  2.04% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 10 negatives ( 32.26% ) and 8 positives ( 25.81% ).












-.1 0 .1 .2 .3
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 20 negatives ( 40.82% ) and 12 positives ( 24.49% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 8 negatives ( 25.81% ) and 7 positives ( 22.58% ).











-.02 0 .02 .04 .06
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 24 negatives ( 48.98% ) and 4 positives (  8.16% ).














City level. 49 cases, with 25 negatives ( 51.02% ) and 6 positives ( 12.24% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 9 negatives ( 29.03% ) and 6 positives ( 19.35% ).












-.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 30 negatives ( 61.22% ) and 5 positives ( 10.20% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 11 negatives ( 35.48% ) and 6 positives ( 19.35% ).











-.02 0 .02 .04 .06
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 7 negatives ( 14.29% ) and 14 positives ( 28.57% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 5 negatives ( 16.13% ) and 6 positives ( 19.35% ).












-.05 0 .05 .1
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 11 negatives ( 22.45% ) and 12 positives ( 24.49% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 10 negatives ( 32.26% ) and 5 positives ( 16.13% ).












-.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 20 negatives ( 40.82% ) and 6 positives ( 12.24% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 9 negatives ( 29.03% ) and 4 positives ( 12.90% ).
Instruments subject: Takings and Relocation
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3467703 













-.005 0 .005 .01 .015
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 20 negatives ( 40.82% ) and 0 positives (  0.00% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 11 negatives ( 35.48% ) and 2 positives (  6.45% ).













-.08 -.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 33 negatives ( 67.35% ) and 3 positives (  6.12% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 10 negatives ( 32.26% ) and 2 positives (  6.45% ).











-.04 -.02 0 .02
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 22 negatives ( 44.90% ) and 6 positives ( 12.24% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 20 negatives ( 64.52% ) and 2 positives (  6.45% ).












-.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 41 negatives ( 83.67% ) and 0 positives (  0.00% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 25 negatives ( 80.65% ) and 1 positives (  3.23% ).













-.04 -.02 0 .02 .04
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 26 negatives ( 53.06% ) and 3 positives (  6.12% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 16 negatives ( 51.61% ) and 1 positives (  3.23% ).











-.1 -.05 0 .05
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 30 negatives ( 61.22% ) and 4 positives (  8.16% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 16 negatives ( 51.61% ) and 1 positives (  3.23% ).












-.03 -.02 -.01 0
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 37 negatives ( 75.51% ) and 0 positives (  0.00% ).













-.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 41 negatives ( 83.67% ) and 0 positives (  0.00% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 28 negatives ( 90.32% ) and 0 positives (  0.00% ).












-.01 -.005 0 .005 .01
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 33 negatives ( 67.35% ) and 1 positives (  2.04% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 7 negatives ( 22.58% ) and 0 positives (  0.00% ).













-.08 -.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 35 negatives ( 71.43% ) and 0 positives (  0.00% ).












-.08 -.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 41 negatives ( 83.67% ) and 0 positives (  0.00% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 19 negatives ( 61.29% ) and 0 positives (  0.00% ).












-.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 40 negatives ( 81.63% ) and 3 positives (  6.12% ).













-.05 0 .05 .1
LS-IPD
City level. 49 cases, with 26 negatives ( 53.06% ) and 7 positives ( 14.29% ).
Province level. 31 cases, with 28 negatives ( 90.32% ) and 0 positives (  0.00% ).
Instruments subject: Education
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(d) Provincial Party Secretary’s Political Cycles




Appendix 1: Distinguishing between formal regulations and IPDs  
 
Under Chinese law the distinction between formal regulations (FRs) and informal policy 
directives (IPDs) is black and white. Procedurally, since the enactment of the Law on Legislation in 2000, 
all FRs are issued as decrees (ling) in the names of the chief executive—at the provincial and city levels, 
governors and mayors. They are consecutively numbered and always published.  
 
Substantively, six features of FRs distinguish them from IPDs:42 
 
1. Internal approval procedures. FRs generally must be deliberated during meetings of the heads of 
the each lawmaking entity (e.g. provincial or city PG), and signed by and issued in the name of 
the head of the entity. By contrast, IPDs may not go through such deliberation, and are generally 
issued in the name of institutions and not of their chief executives.  
2. Public comment. Drafts of proposed FRs must be published to solicit public comments, whereas 
public notice and comment is at most recommended and never required for IPDs. 
3. Publications. FRs must be published to take effect. IPDs are often distributed only internally in 
the government bureaucracy.  
4. Non-retroactivity. FRs are generally not permitted to have retroactive effect, unless they are 
“favorable to regulated subjects”. By contrast, because IPDs do not have binding legal effect, are 
often intended to be merely interpretive, and/or state non-binding policy positions, they are not 
subject to explicit non-retroactivity requirements.  
5. Pre-enforcement review. FRs are reviewable for their legality through non-judicial channels 
independently of their specific implementation; that is, pre-enforcement review of a 
problematic regulation can be sought from a superior agency or legislative entity, instead of 
waiting for a specific government action, challengeable in court, to be taken. By contrast, 
precisely because IPDs are not supposed to have the binding force of law, there is no 
mechanism for pre-enforcement review.  
6. Effect upon adjudication. FRs constitute law in the sense that they are binding on courts, unless 
they conflict with laws of superior status. If a formal regulation is found by a court to conflict 
with higher law, the court must initiate non-judicial, legislative mechanisms for determining the 
legality of the regulation. Prior to such determination, courts generally do not have the choice of 
not applying an FR. However, courts, in reaching judgements, may decline to apply an IPD if it is 
deemed unreasonable. FRs are thus entitled to a high level of judicial deference. Moreover, FRs 
have superior legal effect over any IPD.  
 
Like the administrative states in most other countries, Chinese executive branch agencies issue a 
whole slew of administrative guidance, interpretative documents, and informal policy statements that 
are intended to be generally enforced and complied with. However, IPDs are usually issued pursuant to 
agency protocols that also govern the issuance and transmission of internal documents that do not 
purport to have policy significance. The release of such internal documents to the public is not 
systematic and thus IPDs are generally not consecutively numbered.  
 
                                                 
42 The features characterize FRs adopted at all levels of government. Variations in the frequencies of FR adoption 
thus cannot be explained by variations in procedural requirements.  
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While IPDs do not bind courts, courts may defer to the government positions stated in IPDs for a 
variety of reasons. The most common reason is that policy positions in formal laws and regulations are 
highly abstract or ambiguous, and detailed policy positions are developed only through IPDs. In such 
circumstances, it is unlikely that that the IPD would be in explicit conflict with superior law. Therefore, in 
applying the law, courts tend to defer to agency policy expertise and lack incentives to challenge agency 
policy. This is especially the case because the Chinese judiciary is of the civil law variety, and Chinese 
judges, unlike common law judges, generally do not set precedents.   
 
Appendix 2: Construction of Dependent Variables  
 
This appendix discusses the construction of our dataset on provincial and city statutes (LS), FRs, 
and IPDs. 
 
The data on LS and FR from Chinalawinfo is straightforward as each type of instrument is 
identified consistently through numbering conventions adopted by the promulgating entities. In 
particular, an FR is identified by a governor or mayor decree (ling), and thus unmistakably distinct from 
IPDs. If a given legal instrument carries out the amendment of multiple prior laws, we count the 
instrument as one rather than multiple instances of lawmaking. 
 
Because the classification of IPDs is inherently problematic, the measurement of IPDs is 
imprecise. While some national ministries have adopted the practice of issuing all policy documents of 
public relevance using a single format, few subnational governments have done so. And although 
Chinalawinfo’s search function for “normative documents” (guifanxing wenjian) allows one to separate 
an executive branch entity’s IPDs from its FRs, some of the documents generated by this type of search 
do not have policy significance.  
 
The challenge of distinguishing between IPDs and other non-policy documents can be illustrated 
by one example. Consider announcements from the Shandong Provincial People’s Government (PPG). 
The Shandong PPG issues multiple series of documents each year, including (a) luzhengfa (Shandong 
Government Issuance); (b) luzhengzi (Shandong Government Text); (c)  luzhengbanfa (Shandong 
Government Secretariat Issuance); (d) luzhengbanzi (Shandong Government Secretariat Text); and (e) 
other types of issuances, including appointments, notices of meetings, telegrams, etc. Two distinctions 
are notable. First, it matters whether a document is issued under the name of the PPG—which means 
that it may have been approved by the committee of governors or at least one deputy governor—or 
whether it is an issuance of the PPG Secretariat. The latter may still be important, given that it comes 
from the province’s central executive office, but it carries less weight than PPG documents. Thus (a) has 
greater weight than (c), and (b) has greater weight than (d). Second, it matters whether a document is 
intended for general circulation or addresses more specific readers. The former is more likely to state 
policy matters, and documents in categories (a) and (c) tend to conform to this type.  
 
Nonetheless, documents in categories (a)-(e) may all advance policy positions; they simply do so 
with differing probability. None of these categories relates exclusively to the announcement and 
interpretation of policy and rules with general applicability. Unless a government agency or entity 
chooses to issue all and only its policy documents in a single format (or set of formats), the next best 
method for distinguishing between documents with and without policy relevance would be very crude, 
which is to simply see if the agency publishes them. For example, the rate of publication rate is the 
lowest for category (e).  
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Therefore, measuring IPDs faces the dual problems of completeness and noise: some genuine 
IPDs may not be published (since publication is not always a requirement of their effectiveness); some 
government issuances that do not have general applicability may be included in our original data source 
as IPDs (a problem aggravated in recent years due to open government initiatives). Notwithstanding 
these problems—which we address in the ways discussed in Section 2—we gathered all IPDs issued by 
the relevant provincial and city PGs, and classified them (>160,000) according to their titles.   
 
Appendix 3 Topic Classification scheme 
 
Public goods and 
services  
General public 
regulation   
Administration and 
general governance  
Market regulation
   
Economic 
construction 
1. 水利: water 
conservancy 
and irrigation 













social security   









10. 体育: sports  






















according to law 




documents   














场竞争: IP and 
market 
competition  
28. 食品药品: food 










real estate  
32. 工业: 
manufacturing  
33. 对外经贸: trade  
34. 一般服务业: 
general services 
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0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25
City Proportion - Province Proportion












-.05 0 .05 .1 .15 .2
City Proportion - Province Proportion












-.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02 .04 .06 .08
City Proportion - Province Proportion













-.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15 .2
City Proportion - Province Proportion










-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15
City Proportion - Province Proportion










-.02 0 .02 .04 .06
City Proportion - Province Proportion













-.04 -.02 0 .02 .04 .06 .08 .1 .12
City Proportion - Province Proportion











-.05 0 .05 .1 .15
City Proportion - Province Proportion












-.02 0 .02 .04 .06 .08
City Proportion - Province Proportion
Construction and Real Estate, Informal Policy Documents. Total 49, with 44 cases >0 (89.80%).












-.02 0 .02 .04 .06 .08
City Proportion - Province Proportion












-.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02 .04 .06
City Proportion - Province Proportion










-.02 -.01 0 .01 .02 .03
City Proportion - Province Proportion
Public Health, Informal Policy Documents. Total 49, with 27 cases >0 (55.10%).









-.02 0 .02 .04 .06 .08
City Proportion - Province Proportion












-.02 0 .02 .04 .06 .08 .1 .12
City Proportion - Province Proportion










-.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15
City Proportion - Province Proportion
Takings and Relocation, Informal Policy Documents. Total 49, with 42 cases >0 (85.71%).











-.05 0 .05 .1
City Proportion - Province Proportion












-.05 0 .05 .1 .15
City Proportion - Province Proportion












-.03 -.02 -.01 0 .01 .02 .03
City Proportion - Province Proportion
Transportation, Informal Policy Documents. Total 49, with 33 cases >0 (67.35%).
(f) Transportation
We calculate the difference between a city’s proportion of an instrument devoted to a given topic and the proportion
observed in the province in which the city is located. The graphs visualize the distribution of the difference for 49
cities. Positive differences are interpreted as greater policy attention from a city than its province.
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-.08 -.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02 .04 .06
City Proportion - Province Proportion












-.1 -.08 -.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02 .04 .06
City Proportion - Province Proportion











-.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02 .04 .06
City Proportion - Province Proportion
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery, Informal Policy Documents. Total 49, with 7 cases >0 (14.29%).












-.04 -.02 0 .02 .04 .06 .08
City Proportion - Province Proportion










-.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02 .04 .06
City Proportion - Province Proportion











-.025 -.02 -.015 -.01 -.005 0 .005 .01 .015
City Proportion - Province Proportion
Minerals and Energy, Informal Policy Documents. Total 49, with 10 cases >0 (20.41%).











-.04 -.02 0 .02 .04 .06 .08
City Proportion - Province Proportion









-.04 -.03 -.02 -.01 0 .01 .02
City Proportion - Province Proportion











-.05 -.04 -.03 -.02 -.01 0 .01 .02
City Proportion - Province Proportion
Water Conservancy and Irrigation, Informal Policy Documents. Total 49, with 18 cases >0 (36.73%).












-.03 -.02 -.01 0 .01 .02 .03 .04
City Proportion - Province Proportion











-.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05
City Proportion - Province Proportion












-.08 -.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02
City Proportion - Province Proportion
Tax and Public Finance, Informal Policy Documents. Total 49, with 12 cases >0 (24.49%).












-.08 -.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02 .04
City Proportion - Province Proportion












-.1 -.08 -.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02
City Proportion - Province Proportion












-.03 -.02 -.01 0 .01 .02
City Proportion - Province Proportion
Labor and Employment, Informal Policy Documents. Total 49, with 19 cases >0 (38.78%).
(e) Labor and Employment
We calculate the difference between a city’s proportion of an instrument devoted to a given topic and the proportion
observed in the province in which the city is located. The graphs visualize the distribution of the difference for 49
cities. Negative differences are interpreted as lesser policy attention from a city than its province.
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-.02 -.01 0 .01 .02 .03
City Proportion - Province Proportion












-.04 -.02 0 .02 .04 .06
City Proportion - Province Proportion












-.01 -.005 0 .005 .01 .015
City Proportion - Province Proportion
IP and Market Competition, Informal Policy Documents. Total 49, with 17 cases >0 (34.69%).











-.04 -.02 0 .02 .04 .06 .08 .1 .12
City Proportion - Province Proportion












-.04 -.03 -.02 -.01 0 .01 .02 .03 .04
City Proportion - Province Proportion











-.015 -.01 -.005 0 .005 .01 .015 .02
City Proportion - Province Proportion
Population and Marriage, Informal Policy Documents. Total 49, with 20 cases >0 (40.82%).












-.04 -.02 0 .02 .04 .06
City Proportion - Province Proportion










-.03 -.02 -.01 0 .01 .02 .03
City Proportion - Province Proportion












-.05 -.04 -.03 -.02 -.01 0 .01 .02
City Proportion - Province Proportion













-.3 -.25 -.2 -.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05
City Proportion - Province Proportion












-.12 -.1 -.08 -.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02 .04
City Proportion - Province Proportion












-.08 -.06 -.04 -.02 0 .02 .04 .06 .08
City Proportion - Province Proportion
Regulation of Organizations, Informal Policy Documents. Total 49, with 26 cases >0 (53.06%).
(d) Regulation of Organizations
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Appendix 5
Table 1: Determinants of published policy documents: province level. Negative Binomial regressions.
LS FR IPD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Population (millions) -0.568 0.500 0.674 -1.483 -0.183 -0.161 0.478 3.508* -0.665 -0.367 -0.195 -0.732
[0.622] [0.561] [0.639] [1.462] [0.696] [0.859] [1.034] [2.074] [0.611] [0.636] [0.727] [0.710]
GDP (100 thousands of millions) -0.425 -0.236 -0.110 -1.002 -0.199 0.543 0.300 1.252 -0.019 0.280 0.267 -0.591**
[0.355] [0.567] [0.518] [1.150] [0.303] [0.514] [0.484] [1.223] [0.352] [0.316] [0.322] [0.248]
Public expenditure (100 millions) 0.383 0.349 1.012 -0.266 -0.070 0.673 0.358 0.195 0.530**
[0.568] [0.509] [0.782] [0.376] [0.353] [1.079] [0.223] [0.210] [0.246]
Gov. employees (10,000s) -0.422 -0.792** -1.434 -0.110 -0.621 -4.989** -0.439** -0.669*** -0.109
[0.338] [0.396] [1.550] [0.448] [0.426] [1.946] [0.214] [0.195] [0.507]
Fixed asset investments (100 thousands of millions) -0.122 -0.032 -0.727 -0.253 -0.226 -1.448** -0.288** -0.075 -0.125
[0.203] [0.220] [0.559] [0.278] [0.284] [0.697] [0.142] [0.150] [0.200]
Public sector employees (10,000s) 0.349 -1.589 1.171* -0.972 0.448 -0.621*
[0.589] [1.234] [0.613] [1.411] [0.324] [0.348]
Above size ind. firms (00s) -0.167 -0.522* 0.080 0.232 -0.113 0.035
[0.115] [0.293] [0.162] [0.440] [0.082] [0.103]
FDI (100 millions) -0.077* -0.026 -0.013 0.361*** -0.018 -0.023
[0.045] [0.173] [0.048] [0.131] [0.036] [0.057]
Urban area (00s Sq. km) -0.654 -1.342** -0.472
[0.846] [0.631] [0.304]
Ratio of Urban Population (%) 0.045 0.011 0.019
[0.061] [0.056] [0.016]
Lawyers per-millions of inhabitants 0.383* 0.342 0.153***
[0.208] [0.295] [0.053]
Observations 491 401 364 172 491 401 364 170 491 401 364 167
Pseudo-R2 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.19
Results estimated using the Negative Binomial regression model with region and year FEs. Independent variables are in logs. The sample contains 31 provinces and
16 years (2000-2015). In IPD regressions, the subject Personnel Data is excluded when counting the total number of instruments of each province; while in LS-FR
regressions, the subject Archiving and Cancelling documents is excluded. Additionally, within each type of instrument, the top 1% of observations (region-year
level) with most documents are excluded from the regressions. Individual years are used in these regressions. Some independent variables data is not available for
all the years, especially for 2014 and 2015. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05 and * p-value < 0.10. Clustered standard errors at the province level reported in
brackets.
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Table 2: Determinants of published policy documents: city level. Negative Binomial regressions.
LS FR IPD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Population (millions) -0.066 -0.199 -0.077 0.134 0.301 0.191 -0.377 -0.004 -1.715** -1.209* -0.950 -0.686
[0.482] [0.453] [0.612] [0.737] [0.378] [0.431] [0.721] [0.967] [0.697] [0.652] [0.830] [0.880]
GDP (100 thousands of millions) 0.106 0.161 0.264 0.238 -0.091 -0.019 -0.107 -0.251 0.028 0.283 -0.449 -0.726
[0.211] [0.216] [0.285] [0.314] [0.227] [0.248] [0.383] [0.388] [0.669] [0.807] [1.256] [1.336]
Above size ind. firms (00s) -0.144 -0.136 -0.129 -0.189* -0.106 -0.051 -0.300 -0.299 -0.414
[0.129] [0.157] [0.178] [0.098] [0.121] [0.128] [0.335] [0.355] [0.329]
Public sector employees (10,000s) 0.117 0.169 0.036 0.100 0.354** 0.376* -0.381 -0.130 0.032
[0.164] [0.168] [0.152] [0.119] [0.169] [0.207] [0.274] [0.334] [0.396]
FDI (100 millions) -0.067 -0.028 -0.047 -0.047 0.110 0.077
[0.051] [0.044] [0.057] [0.055] [0.105] [0.103]
Public expenditure (100 millions) -0.029 -0.187 0.347 0.263 0.888* 0.739
[0.299] [0.344] [0.342] [0.392] [0.494] [0.534]
Urban area (00s Sq. km) -0.205 -0.232 -0.168 -0.257 -0.518 -0.556
[0.235] [0.248] [0.169] [0.191] [0.318] [0.357]
Ratio of Urban Population (%) 0.018** -0.001 -0.000
[0.009] [0.006] [0.011]
Fixed asset investments (100 thousands of millions) 0.318** 0.225 0.805**
[0.158] [0.142] [0.347]
Observations 760 760 541 456 760 760 540 455 759 759 540 454
Pseudo-R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11
Results estimated using the Negative Binomial regression model with region and year FEs. Independent variables are in logs. The sample contains 49 cities and
16 years (2000-2015). In IPD regressions, the subject Personnel Data is excluded when counting the total number of instruments of each province; while in LS-FR
regressions, the subject Archiving and Cancelling documents is excluded. Additionally, within each type of instrument, the top 1% of observations (region-year
level) with most documents are excluded from the regressions. Individual years are used in these regressions. Some independent variables data is not available for
all the years, especially for 2014 and 2015. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05 and * p-value < 0.10. Clustered standard errors at the city level reported in
brackets.
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Table 3: Determinants of published policy documents: province level. OLS regressions.
LS FR IPD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Population (millions) 0.2703*** 0.6710*** 0.5102** 0.3577 0.0688 0.1344 -0.0766 0.1051 1.5532* 7.8609*** 9.2342*** 8.7428*
[0.0858] [0.2146] [0.2270] [0.3255] [0.0713] [0.1789] [0.2274] [0.2221] [0.8939] [2.2589] [2.8954] [4.9319]
GDP (100 thousands of millions) 0.1804 -0.0081 -0.2010 0.1281 0.5504*** 0.5718*** 0.4559*** 0.3189 -1.1414 -2.4611* -0.9320 -2.6623
[0.1511] [0.1603] [0.1587] [0.4054] [0.1219] [0.1139] [0.1568] [0.2802] [1.4025] [1.4281] [1.8418] [4.5438]
Public expenditure (100 millions) 0.0062 0.0034 0.0077 0.0001 0.0006 0.0000 -0.0232 -0.0057 -0.0428
[0.0041] [0.0043] [0.0055] [0.0023] [0.0022] [0.0031] [0.0345] [0.0400] [0.0530]
Gov. employees (10,000s) -0.6546*** -0.6872*** -0.4918 -0.1413 -0.2660 -0.1900 -9.1071*** -8.8717*** -11.2908***
[0.2114] [0.2015] [0.4491] [0.1702] [0.1625] [0.2196] [2.7477] [2.7657] [3.9721]
Fixed asset investments (100 thousands of millions) -0.3762 -0.2980 -1.0056 0.6331 0.3028 0.2214 12.4267* 13.1113* 20.8402**
[0.7235] [0.6849] [0.8932] [0.6366] [0.7387] [0.7291] [6.7589] [6.6951] [8.4915]
Public sector employees (10,000s) 0.0498 0.0311 0.0643 0.0066 -0.3562 0.1284
[0.0342] [0.1142] [0.0457] [0.0502] [0.6167] [1.3905]
Above size ind. firms (00s) -0.0218 -0.0186 0.0500 0.0461 -0.0171 0.0474
[0.0322] [0.0344] [0.0362] [0.0409] [0.2695] [0.2847]
FDI (100 millions) 0.1468** 0.0509 -0.0313 -0.0261 -0.8838 0.8629
[0.0682] [0.1602] [0.0792] [0.1005] [0.9405] [1.6888]
Urban area (00s Sq. km) 0.2046 0.0780 -3.3253
[0.2108] [0.0900] [2.2007]
Ratio of Urban Population (%) -0.0080 0.0706 -4.6313
[0.7912] [0.3151] [5.5879]
Lawyers per-millions of inhabitants -0.0326 0.0085 0.3212*
[0.0253] [0.0143] [0.1732]
Observations 124 116 116 86 124 116 116 86 124 116 116 86
Adj. R2 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.30 0.41 0.40 0.24
Results estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with year FEs. All variables are in levels. The sample contains 31 provinces and 16 years (2000-2015). In
IPD regressions, the subject Personnel Data is excluded when counting the total number of instruments of each province; while in LS-FR regressions, the subject
Archiving and Cancelling documents is excluded. Additionally, within each type of instrument, the top 1% of observations (region-year level) with most documents
are excluded from the regressions. Years are binned into 4 time periods: 2000-2003, 2004-2007, 2008-2011, 2012-2015. Dependent variables are computed by adding
the four years of each group. Independent variables are calculated by averaging the values of the correspondent variable within each time period. Some independent
variables data is not available for all the years, especially for 2014 and 2015. Those missing values cases are ignored when averaging the variables. Hence, only if
the four years of a time period are missing, the transformed observation is also considered as a missing value. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05 and * p-value
< 0.10. Clustered standard errors at the province level reported in brackets.
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Table 4: Determinants of published policy documents: city level. OLS regressions.
LS FR IPD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Population (millions) -0.5834 -1.1376*** -1.0124** -0.7113 0.3595 -0.2794 0.1948 1.0029 12.2405* 12.3459 14.2648* -2.8046
[0.5297] [0.3880] [0.3986] [0.4411] [0.6429] [0.4978] [0.4806] [0.7141] [7.0381] [7.6337] [8.0390] [9.6252]
GDP (100 thousands of millions) 1.8927*** -1.8315*** -3.6064*** -5.7757*** 1.7995** -1.2226 -4.8997** -7.8671*** 19.2999** -48.3625*** -54.0878** -94.3446**
[0.5289] [0.5589] [1.2496] [1.8393] [0.7111] [1.1425] [1.8569] [1.9235] [9.4748] [15.4475] [25.4519] [39.8228]
Total area (00s Sq. km) -0.0046 -0.0040 -0.0012 0.0066 0.0048 0.0087 -0.3571** -0.3765** -0.3522***
[0.0085] [0.0090] [0.0093] [0.0207] [0.0212] [0.0244] [0.1548] [0.1526] [0.1229]
Above size ind. firms (00s) 0.0974** 0.0653 0.0756 0.0821 0.1284** 0.0953** 4.8391*** 5.5472*** 6.1581***
[0.0375] [0.0503] [0.0555] [0.0595] [0.0627] [0.0385] [1.0095] [0.8193] [1.1793]
Public sector employees (10,000s) 0.1476*** 0.1258*** 0.1125*** 0.1249*** 0.0507 0.0853* 1.4781** 1.1841* 1.9039**
[0.0225] [0.0257] [0.0304] [0.0451] [0.0495] [0.0446] [0.5936] [0.6525] [0.7264]
FDI (100 millions) 0.1813** 0.0863 -0.0031 0.0504 -2.0397 -4.7066***
[0.0693] [0.0735] [0.0917] [0.0949] [1.5650] [1.2519]
Public expenditure (100 millions) 0.0090 0.0436* 0.0306*** 0.0671*** 0.0995 0.2624
[0.0089] [0.0235] [0.0109] [0.0165] [0.3002] [0.3197]
Urban area (00s Sq. km) 0.7349 -0.7475 3.1369*** 0.8639 16.6387 17.4009
[1.1833] [1.4281] [1.0192] [1.1415] [27.5708] [29.1491]
Ratio of Urban Population (%) 0.1086 0.1470* -0.3685
[0.0688] [0.0780] [1.2881]
Fixed asset investments (100 thousands of millions) 0.8760 -2.1926 90.2585*
[1.5529] [1.5981] [51.0084]
Observations 192 192 192 164 192 192 192 164 192 192 192 164
Adj. R2 0.13 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.16 0.23 0.28 0.35 0.38 0.50 0.51 0.57
Results estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with year FEs. All variables are in levels. The sample contains 49 cities and 16 years (2000-2015). In
IPD regressions, the subject Personnel Data is excluded when counting the total number of instruments of each province; while in LS-FR regressions, the subject
Archiving and Cancelling documents is excluded. Additionally, within each type of instrument, the top 1% of observations (region-year level) with most documents
are excluded from the regressions. Years are binned into 4 time periods: 2000-2003, 2004-2007, 2008-2011, 2012-2015. Dependent variables are computed by adding
the four years of each group. Independent variables are calculated by averaging the values of the correspondent variable within each time period. Some independent
variables data is not available for all the years, especially for 2014 and 2015. Those missing values cases are ignored when averaging the variables. Hence, only if
the four years of a time period are missing, the transformed observation is also considered as a missing value. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05 and * p-value
< 0.10. Clustered standard errors at the city level reported in brackets.
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